Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

More documents

Recommendations

Info

136 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’Palestinian Self-Government Authority was to gradually replace the Israeli civilianadministration in the West Bank and Gaza in the fields of ‘education and culture,health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism’ for the duration of a five-year transitionalperiod. 259 In many ways, though, the Palestinians were already in control oftheir own social services, hospitals and schools throughout the West Bank and Gaza,but the declaration now extended these areas of self-rule to include tourism and taxation.The five-year transitional period would begin as soon as the Israelis had withdrawnfrom the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. 260Arrangements would be made ‘for the assumption of internal security and public orderby the Palestinian police consisting of police officers recruited locally and fromabroad’. 261 Israeli withdrawal would begin in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area immediatelyafter the signing of the declaration, and would be completed within fourmonths. 262 Indeed, ‘not later than the eve of the elections for the Council a redeploymentof Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place ...guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populatedareas.’ 263 Further transfer of territory would be dependent upon Palestinian performanceon security: ‘Further [Israeli] redeployments to specified locations will be graduallyimplemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public orderand internal security by the Palestinian police’. 264 The term ‘withdrawal’ was onlyused in the context of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. Future withdrawalswere termed ‘redeployment’ so as not to prejudice future negotiations on the finalstatus of the Occupied Territories.Elections to a Self-Government Council were to be held as soon as possible under‘agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police [would]ensure public order’. 265 These elections were to be held after the Israeli redeployment,and the goal was to hold elections no later than nine months after the entry into force ofthe declaration of principles. The elections would constitute a ‘significant interim preparatorystep toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people andtheir just requirements’. 266 However, nothing was said about what these rights were.The jurisdiction of the Council was to cover the Palestinians in the West Bank andthe Gaza Strip, which both parties viewed as a ‘single territorial unit’ whose integritywould be preserved during the interim period. 267 After the inauguration of the Council,the Israeli civil administration would be ‘dissolved’ and the Israeli military govern-259 Declaration of Principles, Article VI, 2.260 Declaration of Principles, Article V, 1; Heikal 1996, p. 453.261 Declaration of Principles, Annex II.3.c.262 Declaration of Principles, Article XIV; Annex II, 2.263 Declaration of Principles, Article XIII, 1 and XIII, 2.264 Declaration of Principles, Article XIII, 3.265 Declaration of Principles, Article III, 1.266 Declaration of Principles, Article III.267 Declaration of Principles, Article IV.
The Active Mediator137ment would be ‘withdrawn’. 268 However, the Council’s jurisdiction would not coveroccupied East Jerusalem, the numerous Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza,external security, Israeli citizens and foreign relations. The defence of Israeli settlements,use of roads, water resources, etc. would remain in the hands of Israel throughoutthe interim period. Negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gazawould start no later than at the beginning of the third year after the start of the interimperiod and would deal with final security arrangements, borders, the status of Jerusalem,Palestinian refugees and the future of the Israeli settlements. The outcome ofthese negotiations ‘should not be prejudiced by or preempted by agreements reachedfor the interim period’. 269Palestinian bodies under the Council’s control were to be created to manage the electricityand water supplies, ports, the environment, banking, development and land. TheCouncil would also create an effective Palestinian police force, which would be expandedso that it could take over responsibility for the Palestinians in the whole of theWest Bank and Gaza. The declaration of principles also established a number of jointcommittees and cooperative structures for the purpose of mutual security, economiccooperation and regional development programmes, including ‘multilateral workinggroups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a “Marshall Plan” ... including specialprogrammes for the West Bank and Gaza Strip’. 270The Declaration of Principles was not an ordinary peace agreement. Basically, it wasa timetable, a point of departure with many vaguely formulated intentions. The PLOleader Yasser Arafat’s willingness to accept the Oslo Agreement with all its shortcomingsand compromises was undoubtedly a result of his fear of being permanently marginalized.The declaration of principles offered him an opportunity to regain the initiative:‘Peres gave Arafat a stick which he grasped because he was drowning.’ 271 However,given the enormous imbalance in power between the Palestinians and Israel, itwas widely acknowledged that the PLO could hardly have expected a better deal. ThePalestinians had ‘little to give since Israel, as the occupying power, [held] most of thecards’. 272Consequently, from a position of having nothing and being in exile in Tunis, thePLO could now move back to the soil of Palestine. It had obtained self-rule in Gazaand the small city of Jericho. The Israeli Defence Forces would relocate from withinthese two Palestinian population areas, while still surrounding them in order to protectJewish settlers, who were spread all over the West Bank and Gaza in a way that madethe Occupied Territories look like a slice of salami. Israel would maintain the possibilityof immediate reoccupation, if necessary. In reality, though, Israel had full control268 Declaration of Principles, Article VII, 5.269 Declaration of Principles, Article V.270 Declaration of Principles, Article XVI; see also Article VII, VIII and XI and Annex II, 3e.271 Quoted after Lia 1998, p. 21, interview with Azmi Bishara in Middle East Report, vol. 24, no.186, January–February, 1994, p.5.272 Quoted after Lia 1998, p. 21, Clyde Haberman, ‘Terror Pulls Its Chair up to the Peace Table’,New York Times, 31 October 1993, p. 6.
Page 4:
Institutt for fredsforskningInterna
Page 7:
PREFACEIN JANUARY 2001, it was agre
Page 10 and 11:
2 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busines
Page 12 and 13:
Page 14 and 15:
Page 16 and 17:
Page 18 and 19:
10 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busine
Page 21 and 22:
Chapter 1THE ROAD TO OSLOIDEALLY, M
Page 23 and 24:
The Road to Oslo15Palestinians real
Page 25 and 26:
The Road to Oslo17new Israeli gover
Page 27 and 28:
The Road to Oslo19than ever. The Re
Page 29 and 30:
The Road to Oslo21acceptance of the
Page 31 and 32:
The Road to Oslo23After 1945, the i
Page 33 and 34:
The Road to Oslo25headway. The new
Page 35 and 36:
The Road to Oslo27The Madrid Confer
Page 37:
The Road to Oslo29cial framework of
Page 40 and 41:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Page 59 and 60:
Chapter 3THE MODEST FACILITATOR‘T
Page 61 and 62:
The Modest Facilitator53state. The
Page 63 and 64:
The Modest Facilitator55overcome. F
Page 65 and 66:
The Modest Facilitator57accident. I
Page 67 and 68:
The Modest Facilitator59The Oslo op
Page 69 and 70:
The Modest Facilitator61underground
Page 71 and 72:
The Modest Facilitator63kinds of st
Page 73 and 74:
The Modest Facilitator65and I will
Page 75 and 76:
The Modest Facilitator67ister Rabin
Page 77 and 78:
The Modest Facilitator69had been -
Page 79 and 80:
The Modest Facilitator71Rød Larsen
Page 81 and 82:
The Modest Facilitator7379 and in W
Page 83 and 84:
The Modest Facilitator75such an app
Page 85 and 86:
The Modest Facilitator77be accused
Page 87 and 88:
The Modest Facilitator79former US s
Page 89 and 90:
The Modest Facilitator81providing c
Page 91 and 92:
The Modest Facilitator83the importa
Page 93 and 94: Chapter 4THE ACTIVE MEDIATORAFTER F
Page 95 and 96: The Active Mediator87retary in the
Page 97 and 98: The Active Mediator89of the session
Page 99 and 100: The Active Mediator91But Rabin was
Page 101 and 102: The Active Mediator93They agreed to
Page 103 and 104: The Active Mediator95come first. At
Page 105 and 106: The Active Mediator97Singer taking
Page 107 and 108: The Active Mediator99A frustrated A
Page 109 and 110: The Active Mediator101However, the
Page 111 and 112: The Active Mediator103the second ph
Page 113 and 114: The Active Mediator105areas. In fac
Page 115 and 116: The Active Mediator107ings and emot
Page 117 and 118: The Active Mediator109DoP. For the
Page 119 and 120: The Active Mediator111Peres had pre
Page 121 and 122: The Active Mediator113legitimacy fo
Page 123 and 124: The Active Mediator115In Israel, R
Page 125 and 126: The Active Mediator117Washington. 1
Page 127 and 128: The Active Mediator119the changed I
Page 129 and 130: The Active Mediator121an extra trip
Page 131 and 132: The Active Mediator123Palestinians
Page 133 and 134: The Active Mediator125The points of
Page 135 and 136: The Active Mediator127point of view
Page 137 and 138: The Active Mediator129Peres knew th
Page 139 and 140: The Active Mediator131all Israelis
Page 141 and 142: The Active Mediator133asleep, but w
Page 143: The Active Mediator135Three major i
Page 147 and 148: The Active Mediator139ting guarante
Page 149 and 150: The Active Mediator141Informing the
Page 151 and 152: The Active Mediator143was willing t
Page 153 and 154: The Active Mediator145At the meetin
Page 155 and 156: The Active Mediator147demanded that
Page 157: The Active Mediator149There were tw
Page 160 and 161: 152 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busin
Page 194 and 195:
186 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busin
Page 196 and 197:
Page 198 and 199:
Page 200 and 201:
Page 202 and 203:
Page 204 and 205:
Page 206 and 207:
Page 208 and 209:
Page 210 and 211:
Page 212 and 213:
Page 214 and 215:
Page 216 and 217:
Page 218 and 219:
Page 220 and 221:
Page 222 and 223:
Page 224 and 225:
Page 226 and 227:
Page 228 and 229:
Page 230 and 231:
Page 232 and 233:
Page 234 and 235:
Page 236 and 237:
Page 238 and 239:
Page 240 and 241:
Page 242 and 243:
Page 244 and 245:
Page 246 and 247:
Page 248 and 249:
Page 250 and 251:
Page 252 and 253:
Page 254 and 255:
Page 256 and 257:
Page 258 and 259:
Page 260 and 261:
Page 262 and 263:
Page 264 and 265:
show all

Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?