Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

The Active Mediator103the second phase, because the DoP explicitly linked redeployment to the holding ofelections. 83The Grefsheim DoP contained no references to Jerusalem. There was no longer anymention of allowing Palestinians from East Jerusalem to be elected to the self-rulecouncil. Nor was there any specific reference to whether Palestinians from East Jerusalemcould vote at all. The Israeli negotiators also tried to block references to Jerusalemas one of the issues to be raised in the final status talks, but the Palestinians stoodfirm on this, and Jerusalem remained as a topic listed for the final status talks. Unlikethe Sarpsborg DoP, the Grefsheim DoP did not explicitly commit Israel to negotiateon the settlements and on the fate of all of the Palestinian refugees from 1948. Duringthe interim phase, the Grefsheim DoP required the creation of a committee (consistingof representatives of Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinians) to discuss the return ofrefugees from the war in 1967. This was a copy of the formula used in the CampDavid Accords. But nothing was said about the question of arbitration. When the Israeliand the Palestinian negotiators left Grefsheim, they disagreed on numerous pointsof detail. The Grefsheim DoP was taken back to the Tunis and Jerusalem headquartersfor further discussions. 84When the two adversaries met again for the tenth and eleventh rounds (10–12 and24–26 July), this time at Halvorsbøle, another isolated location a bit closer to Oslo, thenegotiations reached crisis point. Whereas it was Israel that had hardened and withdrawnconcessions when Singer had joined the team in June, the turn had now comefor the Palestinians. The PLO representatives sought no less than 26 revisions andamendments to the Grefsheim DoP. As the Palestinians had done during Singer’s interrogationsand demands in June, it was now the Israelis who felt that the other sidewas withdrawing concessions and backtracking on agreements previously made. TheIsraeli negotiators felt that they would have to start again from scratch. The Palestiniannegotiators believed that adopting a tougher line in response to the Grefsheim DoPwas a fair and equal response to what the Israelis had done when the officials had replacedthe academics. 85The Palestinian negotiators in Norway were acting on direct, concrete and tough ordersfrom Arafat. The chairman of the PLO wanted the organization to be mentionedexplicitly. In the declaration, he wanted the term Palestinians to be replaced by theterm PLO. 86 In addition, the Allenby Bridge and the extraterritorial road between Gaza83 Makovsky 1996, pp. 52–58; Peres 1995, pp. 337–339. However, with regard to the question ofelections, the Israeli negotiators were mistaken. Elections were held in January 1996, and thesecond phase started.84 Same references as above.85 Beilin 1999, pp. 105–106; Makovsky 1996, pp. 59–60; Corbin 1994a, pp. 114–119; Savir 1998,pp. 38–41; Heikal 1996, pp. 448–449.86 Corbin 1994a, p. 116. This question was not resolved until minutes before the signing on theWhite House lawn on 13 September 1993, when all references to a Palestinian delegation orteam or to a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation were crossed out with a pen and replaced witha reference to the PLO. Ashrawi 1995, pp. 264–272; Corbin 1994a, pp. 200–201; Beilin 1999,pp. 129–130; Peres 1993, pp. 31–32.