Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

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216 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’wrong signals to the parties’. 309 The state of affairs in 1996 – with closures, terroristattacks, fighting in Lebanon, upcoming Israeli elections and the new Likud governmentthat had won an election on an anti-Oslo platform – did not seem the best time topull out, especially if there was to be any hope of peace in the Middle East. Althougheverything seemed to be on a slippery slope, Norway was not willing to give in.The End of the Oslo EraSerious problems and challenges continued to haunt the peace process. The InterimAgreement was heavily criticized by Palestinians and Israelis alike. Seen through Palestinianeyes, the agreement was a bitter disappointment. Many Palestinian felt thatthe Interim Agreement violated the Declaration of Principles, not least the clause statingthat the ‘two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorialunit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period’. 310 They felt that theInterim Agreement was nothing less than a ‘bantustanization’ of the Occupied Territoriesand a separation of the land from the people. The division of Hebron, finalized inJanuary 1997, had kept the hated Jewish settlements inside the city. More than 60% ofthe Palestinians in the West Bank were dissatisfied with the way in which the Hebronconflict had been resolved. 311The Interim Agreement changed facts on the ground. The Palestinians quickly discoveredthat the situation in the post-Oslo period was, at best, ‘business as usual’. Thespoilers on both sides did everything they could to undermine the agreement and toprevent the process from moving forward. And they succeeded. In February andMarch 1996, Palestinian terrorist attacks inside Israel reached their peak. More than 50Israelis were killed. The borders to Gaza and the West Bank were sealed. Living conditionscontinued to deteriorate, creating together with the political conditions a growingnumber of Palestinian extremists more willing than ever to sacrifice their ownlives in order to kill as many Israelis as possible and to spread fear of terror. 312The building of Israeli settlements continued, violating if not the letter then at leastthe spirit of the Declaration of Principles. Nothing had been said about settlements,other than that the issue had been identified as one of several that were to be carriedover to the final status negotiations. The two adversaries had agreed that nothing wasto be done to change the situation on the ground in the interim period. Yet, both inGaza and the West Bank, new settlements were set up and old settlements were expanded.In Jerusalem, the Jewish population was rapidly increasing. However, thesewere not defined as settlers by Israel, because Jerusalem was seen as already being effectivelyunder Israeli sovereignty. In addition, a network of bypasses, separate roads309 Lia 1998, p. 63, footnote 177.310 Declaration of Principles, Article IV; see also Lia 1998, p. 36.311 Usher 1995, pp. 3–5; Lia 1998, p. 36; Said 1995, pp. 147–164.312 Brynen 2000, pp. 57–63; Shlaim 2001, pp. 527–530; Quandt 2000, pp. 333–338; Lia 1998, pp.33-37.
Implementing Peace217for Jewish settlers only, were carving the West Bank and Gaza into bits and pieces,making the prospect of future Palestinian statehood more remote than ever. 313The situation was no better on the Israeli side, where the most bitter and most poisonouscriticism came from the Israeli right, the settler movement and the religious nationalistcamp. All of their fears had been confirmed with the signing of the InterimAgreement. The whole Oslo process was a disaster in their eyes, leading to what theyregarded as a Palestinization of Judea and Samaria. On 5 October 1995, Prime MinisterRabin presented the agreement and the thinking behind it to the Knesset. The InterimAgreement won the smallest possible majority: 61 members of the Knesset were infavour of it, while 59 voted against. The same day, tens of thousands of demonstratorsgathered in Jerusalem to show their disgust and disapproval. The leader of the LikudParty, Binyamin Netanyahu, took part in this demonstration, calling the agreement an‘act of surrender’ and a ‘danger to the existence of the State of Israel’. 314 He arguedthat ‘[t]he Jewish majority of the State of Israel did not approve this agreement. Weshall fight it and we shall bring down the government.... Rabin is causing a nationalhumiliation by accepting the dictates of the terrorist Arafat’. 315 Leaflets depicting Rabinin an SS uniform were distributed. ‘Rabin is a Nazi’, shouted the crowd. A numberof Holocaust images were used, and Rabin was portrayed as a ‘traitor’, a ‘murderer’, a‘Nazi’ and an ‘illegal prime minister’. 316 To his advisers, Rabin made it clear that hewould continue the peace enterprise he had started, despite the turmoil in the streets,the threats and the incitements. This determination was to cost him his life. 317On 4 November 1995, Rabin attended a huge peace rally in Tel Aviv, with a crowdof some 150,000 people in attendance. It was the largest mass demonstration that TelAviv had witnessed since the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993. Yigal Amir, afanatical 25-year-old law student from Bar-Ilan University, where numerous rightwingand religious extremists were enrolled as students, assassinated the prime minister.Despite the vicious criticism and the ominous warnings that had been voiced, noone had really imagined that the killing of Israel’s leader would or could actually becarried out. The passion and the hate of the extreme religious and nationalist right hadclearly been underestimated. The Oslo process had lost one of its crucial players. 318The murder revealed the deep divisions inside Israel in relation to peace with thePalestinians. While the Israeli left and the Labour Party wanted some sort of compromisewith the Palestinians, the Israeli right – and in particular the extreme nationalistreligious camp – saw the Jewish people as the rightful owners of the Promised Land,the Greater Israel that included all of the Occupied Territories. There was no possibilityof compromise in their minds. The Labour Party supported the building of settlementsbecause they wanted to increase the proportion of land held by Israelis. The parties on313 Shlaim 2001, p. 530.314 Savir 1998, p. 248.315 Shlaim 2001, p. 551.316 Savir 1998, p. 248.317 Shlaim 2001, pp. 546–551; Savir 1998, pp. 247–264; Quandt 2000, pp. 336–338.318 Same references as above.
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Institutt for fredsforskningInterna
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PREFACEIN JANUARY 2001, it was agre
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2 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busines
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10 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busine
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Chapter 1THE ROAD TO OSLOIDEALLY, M
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The Road to Oslo15Palestinians real
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The Road to Oslo17new Israeli gover
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The Road to Oslo19than ever. The Re
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The Road to Oslo21acceptance of the
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The Road to Oslo23After 1945, the i
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The Road to Oslo25headway. The new
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The Road to Oslo27The Madrid Confer
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The Road to Oslo29cial framework of
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Chapter 3THE MODEST FACILITATOR‘T
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The Modest Facilitator53state. The
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The Modest Facilitator55overcome. F
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The Modest Facilitator57accident. I
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The Modest Facilitator59The Oslo op
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The Modest Facilitator61underground
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The Modest Facilitator63kinds of st
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The Modest Facilitator65and I will
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The Modest Facilitator67ister Rabin
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The Modest Facilitator69had been -
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The Modest Facilitator71Rød Larsen
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The Modest Facilitator7379 and in W
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The Modest Facilitator75such an app
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The Modest Facilitator77be accused
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The Modest Facilitator79former US s
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The Modest Facilitator81providing c
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The Modest Facilitator83the importa
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Chapter 4THE ACTIVE MEDIATORAFTER F
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The Active Mediator87retary in the
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The Active Mediator89of the session
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The Active Mediator91But Rabin was
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The Active Mediator93They agreed to
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The Active Mediator95come first. At
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The Active Mediator97Singer taking
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The Active Mediator99A frustrated A
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The Active Mediator101However, the
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The Active Mediator103the second ph
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The Active Mediator105areas. In fac
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The Active Mediator107ings and emot
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The Active Mediator109DoP. For the
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The Active Mediator111Peres had pre
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The Active Mediator113legitimacy fo
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The Active Mediator115In Israel, R
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The Active Mediator117Washington. 1
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The Active Mediator119the changed I
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The Active Mediator121an extra trip
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The Active Mediator123Palestinians
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The Active Mediator125The points of
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The Active Mediator127point of view
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The Active Mediator129Peres knew th
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The Active Mediator131all Israelis
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The Active Mediator133asleep, but w
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The Active Mediator135Three major i
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The Active Mediator137ment would be
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The Active Mediator139ting guarante
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The Active Mediator141Informing the
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The Active Mediator143was willing t
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The Active Mediator145At the meetin
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The Active Mediator147demanded that
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