Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

94 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’These were the questions presented to the PLO representatives in Oslo in May 1993.They represented major departures from the Sarpsborg DoP. Savir and the other Israelisprobably realized that this was the case, but Savir was surprised that the leadersof the PLO gave such obliging and flexible responses. The discussions and the personalchemistry between Savir and Abu Ala developed remarkably well. According toBeilin, Savir and Abu Ala ‘addressed the statement of principles, deleted the appendixconcerning electoral arrangements, made the issue of arbitration hypothetical, changedthe proposal regarding elections in Jerusalem, added a codicil on security and drafted aclause facilitating the inclusion of Jericho’. 39Uri Savir was surprised and impressed by Abu Ala’s emphasis on economic issues.Abu Ala underlined the desire for economic cooperation between the Palestinian selfgovernmentareas and the state of Israel. Such cooperation was not only seen as beneficialto the Palestinian economy, but also as a bridge to regional development. Such astance was also favourable for Israel. Solving the conflict with the Palestinians couldopen up markets for Israel in the surrounding Arab world. Consequently, Savir toocame to share the original Oslo actors’ emphasis on the economic aspects of peace. Ineconomic prosperity lay the possibility of a peaceful future. 40Savir returned to Israel in an enthusiastic mood. Not only was he convinced that theIsraelis finally had found ‘someone to talk to’, but he also seemed confident that Israelcould reach an agreement with the PLO. Savir was convinced that the Oslo BackChannel offered Israel an important opportunity to make peace with the Palestinians,and he thought that the disagreements and differences between the two sides could bebridged and solved. He believed that Arafat was directly behind Abu Ala, so that thelatter spoke with sufficient authority. Furthermore, the emphasis on economic cooperationwould provide Israel with leverage even after political concessions had beenmade. To the Israeli Oslo club, Savir presented a list of recommendations for furtheringthe talks. He stressed the importance of the ‘Gaza plus Jericho’ idea for the Palestinians.The PLO was willing to compromise, and Israel had an opportunity to ‘improveupon the Camp David and Madrid frameworks and reach a gradual settlementstarting in Gaza – while ending PLO terror activities and forging economic cooperationeven before a full autonomy agreement was concluded’. Savir suggested thatsecurity arrangements should be written into the proposed declaration, ‘also specifyingthat the settlements would remain in place’. 41Foreign Minister Peres was now utterly devoted to the process in Norway. Heviewed Oslo as a turning point. He wanted to alter the status quo in the region. TheOslo track was a strategic move to create a common interest with a new partner.Savir’s reports and impressions from Oslo further convinced Peres that the time wasripe for action. To the Israeli Oslo club, Peres proposed that autonomy in Gaza should39 Beilin 1999, p. 87; see also Beilin 1999, pp. 85–88; Peres 1995, pp. 331–333; Savir 1998, pp. 5–28; Makovsky 1996, pp. 46–49; Corbin 1994a, pp. 86–88.40 Beilin 1999, pp. 87–88; Peres 1995, pp. 331–333; Savir 1998, pp. 5–28; Makovsky 1996, pp. 46–49.41 Savir 1998, p. 24; see also the references in previous footnote.