Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

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238 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’the peace negotiations in Washington. He also informed the US secretary of state thatthere was now official participation on the Israeli side. However, Christopher andDennis Ross interpreted this information as a way of telling them what they alreadyknew, namely, that Beilin was involved. Immediately after the meeting, Beilin claimsthat it was a satisfied Norwegian foreign minister who informed him that Christopher‘didn’t press me, and my impression is he thinks Oslo is just a talking-shop. Hedoesn’t know about Uri’. 16 After the Israelis upgraded the talks in May, the US peaceteam knew nothing, were told nothing, understood nothing and were taken completelyby surprise when they were finally informed about the breakthrough in Norway.In general, Norway is very anxious to do nothing that might disturb its close relationshipwith the USA. After all, the United States is Norway’s most important ally. Inaddition, the world’s only remaining superpower is not a state that can be ignored. Formore than 50 years, a guiding principle for Norwegian foreign policy has been to secureUS support. On this occasion, however, Norway allowed Israel to decide the kindof information that was to be passed on to the Americans. Israel deliberately wantedthe USA to be kept in the dark on the issue of the participation of Israeli officials.From the moment the Oslo Back Channel became a serious enterprise, the Americanswere deliberately misled by both Norway and Israel. The Israelis avoided briefing theAmericans and asked the Norwegians to do the same, to which the Norwegiansagreed. For the Norwegians, the most important goal was to protect the Norway channel.If this meant keeping the USA in the dark because Israel wanted things that way,the Norwegian foreign minister was willing to act accordingly. There is no other obviousreason that might explain why Norway refrained from informing and deliberatelymisled the United States.It is difficult to see how informing the Americans of the top-level Israeli participationcould have harmed Norwegian interests, though the Norwegian actors might havefeared that the Americans would hijack their back channel project. On the other hand,the Norwegian foreign minister was taking a calculated risk by not informing theAmericans. Yet, after Holst took over as foreign minister, no effort was made byNorway to present the Americans with a complete picture of what was happening.Presumably, Holst’s motives were to protect the Oslo Back Channel and Norway’srole, but it is easier to understand and explain the Israeli point of view. Israeli ForeignMinister Shimon Peres personally had no high standing in Washington. In contrastwith Prime Minister Rabin, all of Peres’s close contacts and fellow partisans were inEurope. Peres had previously had a bad experience with bypassing the United States:In 1987, the Americans had been opposed to the secret London agreement that he hadreached with King Hussein of Jordan. The Oslo Back Channel was another Peres enterprise.In addition, the Israelis, in general, had a rather ambiguous relationship withtheir big protector. Ever since the days of Prime Minister Golda Meir, Israel had beenmuch more interested in US dollars and arms than US mediation: ‘Our Americanfriends offer us money, arms and advice. We take the money, we take the arms, and16 Beilin 1999, p. 88.
Conclusion239we decline the advice’, as Israel’s famous defence minister Moshe Dayan once remarked.17 The Israelis always strove to stake out their own independent position.In 1991, the United States had to a large degree initiated a peace process in cooperationwith Israel. Israel had insisted that direct negotiations with the PLO were out ofthe question. The USA had accepted this and had agreed to negotiate with local Palestinianleaders instead. This, of course, suited the USA perfectly well, since it had brokenoff its own contact with the PLO in 1990 and might have found it awkward to reopenup direct contacts with the organization. In addition to the peace negotiations inWashington, the US peace team, together with Prime Minister Rabin, was workinghard on and seemed to be enjoying some degree of success in promoting peace withSyria. But, naturally, Israel did not have full control over the USA, and it did not geteverything its own way. The peace negotiations in Washington had been a top priorityfor two US state secretaries. US efforts and prestige were involved. It was not difficultto imagine that the Americans, who were struggling with their own mired process inWashington, would react negatively when informed about the Oslo Back Channel. Afterall, Israel had negotiated peace with the PLO somewhere else, without the Americanseven being informed.However, the Israelis’ main motive for not informing the Americans and for wantingto explore the Oslo track further was most probably that in Norway Israel had foundan easier counterpart than in Washington. In Norway, there was no international pressureon Israel. Moreover, the PLO and a weakened Arafat were a much easier matchfor the Israelis than the international law-oriented, highly educated and stubborn Palestinianrepresentatives in Washington. Compared with the superpower, Norway wasalso a much more willing instrument and was far more ready to go along with Israeliconditions. Israel thus chose the weak PLO and little Norway in order to obtain morefor itself, to protect Israeli self-interests and, hence, to get things its own way.The lack of information given to the USA had been a source of worry for both Israeland Norway. Like a bolt from the blue, on 27 August 1993, the two nervous foreignministers – Peres and Holst – turned up in the USA with a signed declaration of principlesand a proposal for mutual recognition. Something that seemingly had been impossiblefor the negotiators in Washington to achieve was suddenly presented as a faitaccompli by the visiting ministers, and the United States was asked to join their peacetrain. The US peace team was deeply surprised. But the American policymakers werealso somewhat hurt and angry because they had been kept in the dark. Nevertheless,they immediately gave the agreement their warm approval. In many ways, the OsloDeclaration of Principles was a possible blessing for US President Bill Clinton, whobadly needed a public success. There had already been blunders over foreign policy issuesin Bosnia and Somalia. On the domestic front, trade problems, healthcare reformsand the budget deficit loomed large and threatening. A breakthrough in the intractableconflict in the Middle East could be the foreign policy triumph that Clinton needed.An official signing ceremony in the USA would provide the necessary international17 Quoted after Shlaim 2001, p. 316; see also pp. 401–402.
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Institutt for fredsforskningInterna
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PREFACEIN JANUARY 2001, it was agre
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2 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busines
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10 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busine
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Chapter 1THE ROAD TO OSLOIDEALLY, M
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The Road to Oslo15Palestinians real
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The Road to Oslo17new Israeli gover
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The Road to Oslo19than ever. The Re
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The Road to Oslo21acceptance of the
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The Road to Oslo23After 1945, the i
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The Road to Oslo25headway. The new
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The Road to Oslo27The Madrid Confer
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The Road to Oslo29cial framework of
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Chapter 3THE MODEST FACILITATOR‘T
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The Modest Facilitator53state. The
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The Modest Facilitator55overcome. F
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The Modest Facilitator57accident. I
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The Modest Facilitator59The Oslo op
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The Modest Facilitator61underground
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The Modest Facilitator63kinds of st
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The Modest Facilitator65and I will
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The Modest Facilitator67ister Rabin
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The Modest Facilitator69had been -
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The Modest Facilitator71Rød Larsen
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The Modest Facilitator7379 and in W
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The Modest Facilitator75such an app
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The Modest Facilitator77be accused
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The Modest Facilitator79former US s
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The Modest Facilitator81providing c
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The Modest Facilitator83the importa
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Chapter 4THE ACTIVE MEDIATORAFTER F
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The Active Mediator87retary in the
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The Active Mediator89of the session
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The Active Mediator91But Rabin was
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The Active Mediator93They agreed to
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The Active Mediator95come first. At
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The Active Mediator97Singer taking
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The Active Mediator99A frustrated A
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The Active Mediator101However, the
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The Active Mediator103the second ph
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The Active Mediator105areas. In fac
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The Active Mediator107ings and emot
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The Active Mediator109DoP. For the
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The Active Mediator111Peres had pre
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The Active Mediator113legitimacy fo
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The Active Mediator115In Israel, R
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The Active Mediator117Washington. 1
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The Active Mediator119the changed I
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The Active Mediator121an extra trip
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The Active Mediator123Palestinians
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The Active Mediator125The points of
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The Active Mediator127point of view
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The Active Mediator129Peres knew th
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The Active Mediator131all Israelis
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The Active Mediator133asleep, but w
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The Active Mediator135Three major i
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The Active Mediator137ment would be
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The Active Mediator139ting guarante
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The Active Mediator141Informing the
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The Active Mediator143was willing t
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The Active Mediator145At the meetin
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The Active Mediator147demanded that
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The Active Mediator149There were tw
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