Evaluation of the USAID-Kosovo SME and Agriculture - Economic ...

Development Associates, Inc.is now another time for Kosovo. It made significant contributions. Efforts to turn KBS into amore directed and focused project (considered in the sections that follow) has fallen prey to toolittle resources, too late in the project cycle. KBS might have accomplished more pursuing itsoriginal broad-based objectives and ending in September 2003, with a new program cycle tofollow that could provide the concentrated attention that intensive business enterprisedevelopment deserves.2. What are the project implementation lessons?KBS experience suggests that there are different business services best provided to certaingroups. The following table codifies these insights.Customizing Business Development ServicesTarget group Broad business community Target sectors orLevel of assistancesophisticationLow to medium, mostlybasic business plans andmarketing training,clustersMedium to high –development ofmarketing, actionplans andimplementation ofsector strategiesHigh growth potentialenterprisesUsually high –development andimplementation of longtermcompany specificcompetitivenessstrategies.Repetitive activities high medium Low, usually casespecific supportPotentialimplementation partnersRDAs, Businessassociations, Chamber ofCluster/industryworking groups,CBDImplementationCommerceLocal professional serviceproviders, co-financing byUSAIDCBDCDO, qualified localconsultants supervisedby the SMC,volunteerprofessionalsCost effective outreach High Medium LowImpact on client Low Medium to high HighperformanceRDA – Regional Development AgencyCBD – Center for Business DevelopmentCDO – Cluster Development OfficerSMC – Senior Management Consultant3. What are the technical lessons?SMC, supported by fewlocal consultants,qualified volunteersContractors need to be able to establish a dialog with USAID CTOs and engage in a give andtake on target achievability and indicator meaningfulness. Not to do so means that USAID’simplementing arms may be pursuing small-box numbers which do not add to the desireddevelopment outcome. In the early years of KBS, a meaningful give and take was, by allaccounts and from more than one project contractor, not feasible. This is seen most clearly inModification # 10. The “Partners” were directed to perform according to targets that were oftenarbitrarily established, sometimes calling for significant resources to fill un-useful numbers. 11Although the approach of the mission has changed, old targets die hard and they continue to bestrived for, achieved and reported.11 See Appendix One.Evaluation of the USAID/Kosovo SME 20 May 2004and Agriculture/Agribusiness ProgramsVolume I