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deferred general elections until the crisis is over. Parliament couldcall off elections indefinitely if there were enough votes to support acabinet in such a course. Our House of Representatives must beelected every two years. That is fixed by the Constitution. There isa long series of popular rights established by tradition and law inEngland, but Parliament can change the law on every one of them.A totalitarian government, therefore, is one—whatever its form—which possesses the power to enact any law or take any measure thatseems proper to it. That government may consist of a dictator, ora king and cabinet, or a king, cabinet, and parliament, or just aparliament and a president. Provided that government is clothedwith the power to do anything without any limitation on its powers,it is totalitarian. It has total power. Now with us the federal governmentconsists of a president and congress. Even if the President andCongress agreed on a measure it could not be adopted unless underthe Constitution they have the express or implied power to adopt it.The powers conferred on our federal government are very limited.The governments of our states possess powers which in Englandreside in the central Parliament. And there are great powers whichare not granted either to federal government or state, but are reservedto the people. Not only are the powers of the central governmentdivided among Congress and the President and the Court, butthere is an immense range of sovereign powers which the federalgovernment does not possess at all. If our system could be changedso that all the powers of the state legislature could be vested in thecentral government and all the limitations set out in the Constitutioncould be repealed, we would have a totalitarian government hereeven though we preserve the presidency and the Congress and theCourt to determine the division of powers among themselves. Intheory such a change could not take place here without a constitutionalamendment. But it is possible for the powers of states and ofCongress itself to be lost by non-use, by slow abdication underpowerful economic pressures. It is possible for the central government,under one pretext or another, to draw slowly to itself thesepowers. We have seen this happen on a limited scale under limitedpressures. What may happen under more irresistible pressure we canguess.230