R.J. Godlewski's The Independent Counterterrorist. I, Militia. June ...

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unresolved. Similarly, while interdiction has often been treated as a panacea, if practiced successfully it can keep the cartels off-balance by disrupting their operations and raising the costs of doing business. The assistance currently accorded priority under the Merida Initiative (aid in developing rapid deployment, surveillance, and detection capabilities, and training in counternarcotics operations) constitutes a good start in this regard, and should be complemented with additional initiatives in the coming years. The United States can provide nonlethal aid like body armor to the Mexican police, establish institutional frameworks for intelligence-sharing and cross-border interagency cooperation on issues like money laundering, and assist the Mexican police and military in conducting psychological and information operations. The brutality of groups like the Zetas—and their skill in publicizing these exploits—currently permits the cartels to dominate the information environment. The Mexican government must confront this issue if it hopes to redress the current sense of public insecurity. Since 2000, U.S. advisers in Colombia have helped that country’s military and law enforcement agencies implement psychological operations to defeat guerrilla propaganda and weaken insurgent morale; similar efforts would seem to be in order under the Merida Initiative. 138 Anti-Corruption and Human Rights. Of course, any benefits reaped from such assistance will be ephemeral at best if the forces of order in Mexico continue to be penetrated by cartel informants and perceived by the public as “brutal corrupt thugs.” 139 The current U.S. prohibition on training foreign 40
military units implicated in human rights violations and the allocation of several million dollars for vetting purposes represent a basic recognition of this issue, but in going forward Washington must place much greater stress on this problem than is presently the case. Beyond augmenting the resources devoted to Calderon’s anti-corruption campaign, the United States can take several other steps. As they have already begun to do in Central America, U.S. agencies should offer regular personnel exchanges meant to promote a culture of professionalism within Mexican law enforcement and greater awareness of human rights issues within the military. Similarly, the United States should pay particular attention to helping Calderon create the small, specially vetted units that he intends to use for sensitive missions, and insist that any police units receiving access to U.S. intelligence or funding undergo rigorous, comprehensive screening. Finally, while Mexican political and historical sensitivities preclude direct military-to-military human rights training within that country, the United States can strengthen the human rights framework in Mexico by offering financial and technical assistance to the agencies charged with investigating and prosecuting suspected abuses. Though it would be wildly unrealistic to expect that these measures will end the problems of corruption and immunity to punishment in Mexico, they can, if sustained, begin to ameliorate these difficulties and create a core of professionalized security officials. Institutional Development. Efforts to help strengthen weak judicial institutions so far make up a very small part of the Merida Initiative, 41
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R.J. Godlewski’s The Independent
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FOREWORD The presence of drugged fi
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SUMMARY The complexity of many ongo
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Additional institutional measures s
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that those who became addicted were
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to constrain it. Taking mind alteri
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DRUG DEMAND AMONG COMBATANTS Drugs
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equipped troops also causes the sam
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for ailments unrelated to combat. N
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Conflict Supply/Demand Type(s) of D
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that many fighters do not act in a
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Giving drugs to individuals coincid
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in war occurs for a variety of reas
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in the conflict will have to prepar
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use. A type of drug quagmire can de
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“There’s guys who have to have
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with eccentric nicknames reflecting
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law enforcement institutions like E
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parameters of any possible peace ac
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Unlike the Vietnam era, the U.S. mi
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tions of professional military educ
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British routinely sought to destroy
Page 55 and 56: 22. Addressing Organized Crime and
Page 57 and 58: 44. Little study has been done on t
Page 59 and 60: 68. See, for example, Richard Rawso
Page 61 and 62: MEXICO'S NARCO-INSURGENCY AND U.S.
Page 63 and 64: FOREWORD Since 2006, Mexico has rap
Page 65 and 66: SUMMARY On June 30, 2008, President
Page 67 and 68: MEXICO’S NARCO-INSURGENCY AND U.S
Page 69: major foreign traffickers, with dom
Page 74 and 75: taken to recruiting former military
Page 76 and 77: Another calling card of these group
Page 78 and 79: implications of the narcotics-fuele
Page 80 and 81: part of the country. Felipe Caldero
Page 82 and 83: public servants—whether local cop
Page 84 and 85: Coahuila in 2006. 71 These practice
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Page 90 and 91: extended throughout Latin America.
Page 92 and 93: to place greater stress on promotin
Page 94 and 95: poor farmers and thus undercut the
Page 96 and 97: National Drug Intelligence Center a
Page 98 and 99: complain of having signed coca erad
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Page 102 and 103: honest, professional manner. The Me
Page 104 and 105: In congressional hearings on the Me
Page 108 and 109: ut improving and expanding U.S. eng
Page 110 and 111: addict rehabilitation—can have a
Page 112 and 113: have long nourished the drug trade
Page 114 and 115: Beltrans Join the Golf Cartel and Z
Page 116 and 117: in 2007. “Homicidio de presunto z
Page 118 and 119: 49. U.S. Immigration and Customs En
Page 120 and 121: 71. Sarah Miller Llana, “Military
Page 122 and 123: for Mexico and Central America, Was
Page 124 and 125: 106. Gabriel Marcella, The United S
Page 126 and 127: 123. “Visit to Cucuta, on Colombi
Page 128 and 129: FROM THE NEW MIDDLE AGES TO A NEW D
Page 130: ***** The Strategic Studies Institu
Page 133 and 134: and restoring order, and remains ov
Page 136 and 137: SUMMARY Security and stability in t
Page 138 and 139: disengagement at the other. The fir
Page 140 and 141: FROM THE NEW MIDDLE AGES TO A NEW D
Page 142 and 143: Observers who see the dominance of
Page 144 and 145: government has dominated U.S. plann
Page 146 and 147: ecome regarded as a global “space
Page 148 and 149: countries at the bottom that are fa
Page 150 and 151: The medieval order was a highly fle
Page 152 and 153: skewed in the direction of the ethn
Page 154 and 155: group, religion, or sect—has crea
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control of drug trafficking routes
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to illicit activities is a natural
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ability of the various nonstate act
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ted urban spaces that are no longer
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Although it might appear contrived
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where the riots discussed above wer
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spite of such measures as the Conta
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ecome increasingly apparent, while
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analyzed within the context of the
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a nuclear weapons state. Conditions
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demands are likely to “encounter
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spreading. To some extent, these co
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V. GLOBAL INSTABILITY AND U.S. STRA
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indivisible. From this perspective,
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of loyalty to the mission, and focu
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assumption that although these tren
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order discussed above. Yet this mig
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15. Ibid. 16. John Rapley, “The N
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Crime, New York: Simon and Schuster
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2007, posted by and available at ww
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93. Ibid., p. 7. 94. Ibid., p. 34.
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