R.J. Godlewski's The Independent Counterterrorist. I, Militia. June ...

why Calderon’s programs have not produced the
desired results.
The armed forces are generally thought to be far
more honest and trustworthy than the police, which
is one reason why Calderon has relied so heavily on
the military since taking office. Even this institution,
however, is highly vulnerable to the predations of the
cartels. Low pay and difficult working conditions led
to an astounding 100,000 desertions between 2000 and
2006, and nearly 50,000 more since Calderon’s ascension
to the Presidency. The Zetas and other paramilitary
organizations tempt soldiers to switch sides by offering
salaries of up to $3,000 per week (in comparison to
the $1,100 per month earned by most members of the
armed forces). 67 Banners hung by the Zetas promise “a
good salary, food, and medical care for your families,”
as well as “loans and life insurance.” 68 The undeniable
allure of these offers has led many Mexican officials
to fear that militarizing the drug conflict will simply
lead to greater corruption within the armed forces,
weakening the one relatively reliable pillar of public
order in the country. 69
Calderon’s reliance on the military has proved
problematic in other respects as well. The Mexican
army has a sorry history of human rights abuses,
symbolized by the Tlatelolco massacre of 1968. The
armed forces’ record has improved in recent decades,
but violations have increased since the military
became the essential implement of Calderon’s strategy.
According to one estimate, there have been more than
600 human rights violations since late 2006. 70 These
abuses allegedly include extrajudicial executions,
illegal detentions, and torture. Soldiers are accused of
stealing from residents during drug-related searches,
and of sexually assaulting 14 women in the state of
17