R.J. Godlewski's The Independent Counterterrorist. I, Militia. June ...

public servants—whether local cops or prominent
politicians—who oppose the drug traffickers risk a
violent, painful death. “Why would anyone want to be
a cop,” asks one Mexican commentator, “when no one
can guarantee their safety, less so their life?” 60 Those
who collaborate with the cartels, on the other hand,
are in line for massive payoffs—up to $450,000 per
month for high-ranking officials, according to recent
reports. 61
The cartels have used this time-tested formula of
plata o plomo (“money or lead”) to co-opt large segments
of the Mexican government. Local police officers have
reportedly kidnapped the Zetas’ competitors and
delivered them to that paramilitary organization to be
tortured and killed. 62 More commonly, the local police
provide the cartels with early warning of impending
government operations. “Everyone in the world knows
we’re coming,” one federal police official complains. 63
The scope of the corruption is difficult to overstate.
In several instances, local police forces have become
so thoroughly infested with informers that the federal
government has been forced to disband them entirely.
This same problem applies to the federal police; within
the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI), an organization
that was itself created to replace Mexico’s hopelessly
corrupt Federal Judicial Police, 2,500 of 7,000 agents
were being investigated for crimes as of late 2005. 64
Since July 2008, Mexican intelligence agencies have
warned that the cartels have secured the cooperation
of members of the national legislature, officials at
the highest levels of the attorney general’s office,
and perhaps even the U.S. embassy. 65 The traffickers,
warns Guillermo Valdes, Mexico’s intelligence chief,
are “trying to take over the power of the state.” 66 Given
this level of corruption, it is not difficult to understand
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