R.J. Godlewski's The Independent Counterterrorist. I, Militia. June ...

CONCLUSION
As the apparent intractability of the gun issue
demonstrates, crafting a comprehensive counternarcotics
strategy will be no easy undertaking. Doing
so will require going past the politically popular aspects
of counternarcotics, such as interdiction, and zeroing
in on more contested issues like guns and demand. In
financial terms, funding at the necessary levels all of the
programs discussed above will involve expenditures
considerably beyond those already approved for Plan
Merida. Moreover, creating such a program will entail a
determined effort by the White House Office of National
Drug Control Policy to ensure that counternarcotics
receives sustained executive-level attention and that
the myriad agencies involved—ranging from the ATF
to USAID—achieve the coordination necessary to
preclude one aspect of this strategy from countering
the efforts of the others. Finally, it bears repeating that
the inter-hemispheric drug trade is so entrenched that
even a “perfect” counternarcotics strategy will produce
meaningful progress only over the long term.
The costs of action are therefore high, but the price
of inaction would be exponentially greater. The effects
of drug use in the United States and the potential for the
economic and political destabilization of Mexico make
counternarcotics an immensely significant national
security issue. Addressing this problem effectively will
require substantial economic resources and political
capital, but, given the stakes, the investment is a
necessary one. American policymakers must seize on
the current crisis to achieve a balanced counternarcotics
policy, one that not only strengthens Mexico’s forces
of order but also addresses the underlying issues that
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