R.J. Godlewski's The Independent Counterterrorist. I, Militia. June ...

spreading. To some extent, these conditions develop
from what Liotta terms “creeping vulnerabilities.” 95 In
the context discussed here, however, they have become
dramatic, highly visible, and fast moving. To focus on
these conditions is not to deny the existence of enemies
who will flourish within chaos. Nor is it to ignore the
likely existence of spoilers who will seek to prevent the
restoration of order. Neutralizing enemies and dealing
with spoilers will be essential if the United States is
to have any chance of success in any intervention to
restore order. Moreover, providing a congenial security
environment will clearly be a prerequisite for success
in reestablishing governance. If military successes are
a necessary condition for successful management of
the kinds of contingencies that are likely to arise in
the New Dark Age, however, they are not a sufficient
condition.
Second, the analysis here is ultimately far more
pessimistic than that continued in the JOE. The JOE
assessment, at least implicitly, incorporates many of the
characteristics of the New Middle Ages. The argument
here is that we are already moving from the New Middle
Ages to the New Dark Age, and that the challenges of
security in an increasingly chaotic environment will be
even more formidable than they already are. In terms
of wicked problems, the frightening thing is that we
have not seen anything yet.
The third difference flows from this. Understandably
there is a “can do” quality about the military operations
envisaged as likely within the emerging joint
operational environment. Military planning after all is
designed for success not failure. Yet the difficulties the
United States has confronted in Iraq—although they
stemmed in part from no planning rather than poor
planning—suggest that the challenges are formidable,
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