R.J. Godlewski's The Independent Counterterrorist. I, Militia. June ...

a nuclear weapons state. Conditions of chaos, looting,
and violence are not conducive to secure command
and control. A race for the acquisition of “loose nukes”
between states and nonstate actors, therefore, is not
out of the question. And if states lose this race, the
radical and sudden empowerment of nonstate actors
will demand an immediate reevaluation of many of
the orthodoxies about weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) terrorism.
The point about such contingencies is not that they
will necessarily happen, but that they represent a set of
threats and challenges that have multiple implications
for U.S. policy and strategy during the next few
decades. A key issue, therefore, is the extent to which
this has been recognized in the U.S. national security
community. The next section addresses this.
IV. U.S. THINKING ABOUT SECURITY
AND STRATEGY
There is no single or easy answer to the question
about threat recognition. The National Security Strategy
of 2006, for example, is unabashedly Wilsonian in
tone and optimistic in outlook. Although the Bush
administration is very different from its predecessor
in its willingness to use military force, the underlying
thrust of U.S. policy remains that articulated by the
Clinton administration—“engagement and enlargement.”
82 The emphasis is on spreading democracy
and promoting development. Democracy is treated
as synonymous with good governance, while the
focus on development, although well-placed, does
little to help the bottom billion or the urban poor.
The idea of stability is given little attention. In terms
of threats, four categories are identified: traditional
threats from other states, irregular challenges from
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