R.J. Godlewski's The Independent Counterterrorist. I, Militia. June ...

for “integrated operations . . . in Joint, interagency,
and multinational environments.” 103 In addition, it
has acknowledged the need to integrate the elements
of national power—diplomatic, military, economic,
and information. 104 Taking this a step further and
developing the transagency organizational structures
discussed above might enhance the prospects that
these selective interventions would create the desired
results. Even selective interventions require the holistic
exercise of power and a more coherent organizational
approach than has been evident in Iraq.
The difficulty is that adaptation by the United
States is constrained by intense partisanship and by
an anachronistic set of institutional arrangements and
procedures for managing national security policy.
Gone are the days when politics stopped at the water’s
edge. Partisanship not only encourages the adoption
of extremes rather than more prudent and moderate
alternatives but also results in dramatic course
shifts when presidential incumbents are replaced
by members of the opposing party. Similarly, many
institutional arrangements in the United States are
unsuited to the demands of the 21st century. Reform
of American government in general and the national
security apparatus in particular might be a necessary—
albeit not a sufficient—condition for the United States
to function effectively in dealing with the challenges of
emerging global chaos.
The other constraints on the United States are
the increasingly obvious fiscal and economic trends.
In the short and medium terms, the possibility of a
U.S. economic meltdown and a global realignment of
economic power cannot be excluded. The ripple effects
of such an event would greatly intensify the trends and
tendencies towards the dissolution of the Westphalian
48