CORRUPTION
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Interview with Jessica Tillipman<br />
International Affairs Forum<br />
24<br />
the case. If a company adheres to these<br />
requirements for the term of the agreement,<br />
then the company may avoid prosecution. The<br />
agreements have provided companies with some<br />
level of comfort and certainty when negotiating<br />
with the government, while simultaneously<br />
enabling the government to settle a greater<br />
number of enforcement actions.<br />
A number of countries that have had difficulty<br />
prosecuting foreign bribery cases do not have<br />
similar settlement mechanisms. Some countries<br />
are now investigating whether they can integrate<br />
DPAs and NPAs into their criminal justice<br />
systems. For example, the UK is already using<br />
DPAs and other countries, such as Australia, are<br />
discussing it as well.<br />
Over the past 15 years, the United States has<br />
worked with other countries to improve global<br />
anti-corruption enforcement. When the FCPA<br />
was passed in the late ‘70s, the US was alone<br />
in the world in its attempt to prosecute foreign<br />
bribery. In fact, until recently, many countries<br />
considered bribes to be tax deductible. After<br />
passing the FCPA, the US government spent<br />
the next several decades lobbying the world<br />
to pass similar laws. Ultimately, this resulted<br />
in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention which<br />
obligated countries to enact and implement<br />
FCPA-like laws. Subsequently, many have done<br />
so. Eventually, similar treaties were enacted,<br />
such as the United Nations Convention Against<br />
Corruption (UNCAC).<br />
In recent years, we have seen increased efforts<br />
in other countries to ramp up the enforcement<br />
of their foreign anti-bribery laws. For example,<br />
enforcement in Canada, the UK, Germany, and<br />
Switzerland has been more robust. The “active”<br />
countries are pushing other countries to ramp up<br />
their enforcement as well.<br />
Over the past eight years, we’ve seen a seismic<br />
shift in views regarding compliance programs.<br />
The DOJ and SEC have released guidelines<br />
which outline the “hallmarks” of an effective<br />
compliance program. This guidance mirrors<br />
what we are seeing around the world. We now<br />
say that there is an emerging “global” anticorruption<br />
compliance standard for companies<br />
promoted by organizations such as Transparency<br />
International, the World Bank, the United<br />
Nations, and the OECD. The UK Bribery Act<br />
developed similar guidelines regarding what<br />
is expected of companies that operate multinationally.<br />
As part of the Department of Justice Fraud<br />
Sections’ FCPA Enforcement Plan and<br />
Guidance, a Pilot Program has been launched<br />
to promote and facilitate voluntary disclose<br />
of FCPA violations. Since the launch, DOJ<br />
has released two declination letters for<br />
Akamai Technologies and Nortek, Inc. and the<br />
SEC announced disgorgement settlements.<br />
What are your thoughts on the program and<br />
prospects for its success?<br />
I view the pilot program as simply memorializing<br />
an existing DOJ policy. As discussed, DOJ<br />
has been encouraging companies for over<br />
ten years to disclose violations voluntarily.<br />
However, companies could not see the benefit<br />
in disclosure as disclosure would often result in<br />
huge fines and penalties. Without clarity from the<br />
government, companies failed to see the benefit<br />
in coming forward when there was a chance<br />
the government might not find out about the<br />
misconduct.<br />
So, in recent years, the government has tried<br />
to be very clear about what that benefit is.<br />
Often, in a settlement with a company, the<br />
government will outline the steps that it took to<br />
determine fines and penalties. If the sentencing<br />
guidelines calculated the penalty as X, a<br />
company, by voluntarily disclosing the illegal