Introduction to Basic Legal Citation - access-to-law home

. . . .
Our decision finds support in the Department's tax regulation pertaining to property used in
manufacturing. We have previously stated that the interpretation by the agency charged with
administering a statute is persuasive, and that great deference should be given to that
interpretation if it is within the language of the statute. See Collins Discount Liquors v. State
of Nevada, 106 Nev. 766, 768, 802 P.2d 4, 5 (1990); Nevada Power Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 102 Nev. 1, 4, 711 P.2d 867, 869 (1986). NAC 372.370(1) states that a tax applies to
the sale of tangible personal property purchased "for the purpose of use in manufacturing,
producing, or processing tangible personal property and not for the purpose of physically
incorporating it into the manufactured article to be sold." Subsection (2) of that regulation
states that a tax does not apply to the sale of tangible personal property purchased "for the
purpose of incorporating it into the manufactured article to be sold." NAC 372.370 focuses on
the purpose for which property is purchased. The requirement that the purpose be "primary" is
implicit. NAC 372.370 is therefore consistent with NRS 372.050, and sets forth a primarypurpose
test.
. . . .
Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 123
RULE 123. Citation to unpublished opinions and orders
An unpublished opinion or order of the Nevada Supreme Court shall not be regarded as
precedent and shall not be cited as legal authority except when the opinion or order is (1)
relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel; (2) relevant
to a criminal or disciplinary proceeding because it affects the same defendant or respondent in
another such proceeding; or (3) relevant to an analysis of whether recommended discipline is
consistent with previous discipline orders appearing in the state bar publication.
New Hampshire: Supreme Court citation practice | Citation rule(s)
| < | >
Examples from State v. Caswell, 146 N.H. 243, 769 A.2d 387 (2001)
. . . .
206
Contents | Index | Help
We next consider the defendant's argument that the trial court erred by admitting Sergeant
Bourque's testimony to establish that the Intoxilyzer was properly certified and operating
properly at the time of the test. RSA 265:85 (Supp. 2000) provides that "no tests of . . . breath
authorized by RSA 265:84, IV shall be considered as evidence in any proceeding before any .
. . court unless such test is performed in accordance with methods prescribed by the
commissioner of the department of health and human services." These rules are codified in
New Hampshire Code of Administrative Rules, Part He-P 2207, and became effective April 1,
1996. As a result, we review the evidence presented at trial in accordance with these rules.