Introduction to Basic Legal Citation - access-to-law home

amount of compensation an attorney may receive for representing a petitioner in a postconviction
death penalty case is $ 37,500. Id. Under these rules, the Division of Finance will
also "pay reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed a total of $ 20,000 in any one case for
court-approved investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants." Utah Admin. Code r. 25-14-
5.
. . . .
48 On April 22, 2004, Menzies filed a notice of appeal with the district court indicating that
he would seek review of the court's denial of 60(b) relief as well as the order regarding the
destruction of the inadmissible documents. Menzies' appeal is now before this court. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (2002).
. . . .
65 The first question we must consider is whether Menzies' 60(b) motion was timely. A
motion under 60(b) must "be made within a reasonable time and for reason[] (1) . . . not more
than 3 months after the judgment . . . was entered." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). In cases where
subsection (b)(1) applies, a movant may not attempt to circumvent the three-month filing
period by relying on another subsection. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984);
Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Under rule 60(b), a reasonable
time "depends upon the facts of each case, considering such factors as the interest in finality,
the reason for the delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds
relied upon, and prejudice to other parties." Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 1993)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In general, the moving party satisfies the
reasonable time requirement if she shows "that she acted diligently once the basis for relief
became available, and that the delay in seeking relief did not cause undue hardship to the
opposing party." Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
. . . .
68 The problem with the State's argument is that the State fails to distinguish between a
motion that is properly supported for purposes of the particularity requirement and a motion
that is timely filed for purposes of avoiding the limitations provisions of 60(b). Both rule 7
and rule 4-501 are designed to "promote the policies of (1) mitigating prejudice to opposing
parties by allowing that party to respond to the motion . . . and (2) assuring that a court can be
apprised of the basis of a motion and rule upon it with a proper understanding." See Holmes
Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 58, 48 P.3d 895 (discussing requirements for motions to
amend). If a party fails to "comply with Utah's formal motion practice rules," a district court
may, within its discretion, deny the motion on the grounds that it is insufficient. Id. 59.
However, sufficiency is not a logically necessary component of timeliness. A party can timely
move the court for relief despite the fact that its motion may be insufficient because, for
example, it lacks particularity. In such a situation, the court has the discretion, consistent with
the policy concerns noted above, either to deny the motion as being insufficient or to allow
the party to supplement the originally insufficient motion. In the case before us, the district
court chose the latter option, holding that Menzies' 60(b) motion was timely filed and that
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