entire book - Chris Hables Gray
entire book - Chris Hables Gray
entire book - Chris Hables Gray
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Scientists and War<br />
Future Peace [ 231 ]<br />
The relationship between scientific discovery, technological invention and<br />
war has varied, as even a quicloand-dirty history shows. In ancient times<br />
Archimedes refused to reveal the details of the engines of war he invented<br />
to defend his mother city, Syracuse, from the Romans. Earlier, the wheel was<br />
used on toys for hundreds of years before it was used on chariots. In China,<br />
gunpowder was for fireworks, not killing (Mumford, 1934, p. 84). War was<br />
only indirectly effected by discovery and innovation, except at those times<br />
when a new weapon or technology would revolutionize warfare completely.<br />
The Bronze Age became Iron as the stronger metal bested the earlier one.<br />
Chariots swept the ancient Middle East; Sun Tzu's subtle and codified<br />
insights into war allowed the State of Wu to dominate the Middle Kingdom;<br />
and English long bows cut down French knights in the Middle Ages. But<br />
after each innovation stability would quickly return. New methods often<br />
took hundreds of years before they were even applied to war.<br />
In large part this is because war is such a strong cultural force. It often<br />
resisted the introduction of effective killing technologies for many years<br />
because they didn't fit the war discourse of the time. Even as recently as the<br />
seventeenth century in Japan, the warrior caste (samurai) succeeded in<br />
banning guns from 1637 to 1867 (Perrin, 1979).<br />
Some have even argued that war and progress (technological and<br />
scientific) have been inexorably linked through the ages. There is much<br />
evidence to contradict this as a historical analysis, as John Nef shows in his<br />
<strong>book</strong> War and Human Progress, but the relationship of "progress" (technological<br />
and scientific) and war today is almost symbiotic. Perhaps as many as<br />
half of all engineers and scientists in the United States work for the military<br />
and in accord with military priorities (Nef, 1963; D. Dickson, 1984). Worldwide<br />
there are probably half a million scientists and engineers working on<br />
military problems (D. Dickson, 1984, p. 108).<br />
The recent militarization of science is quite a change from the earlier<br />
relationship. Greek philosophy disdained war or anything practical. Roman<br />
engineering certainly focused on the needs of empire, but what we now call<br />
science (then still called philosophy) was hardly militarized. It was at the<br />
beginning of the modern era that this began to change significantly. The<br />
physics of cannonballs framed many of Galileo's questions, and the first major<br />
commercial product of optics was military telescopes.<br />
Still, science was not focused on war even as war began to focus on<br />
science. Only 10 percent of the members of the early Royal Society did war<br />
work. The number is at least four times higher now (Ziman, 1976, p. 11). And<br />
todays technoscience is much more powerful than the earlier alliance of<br />
engineering brotherhoods, mechanics, alchemists, natural philosophers, and<br />
mathematicians who founded modern science.