entire book - Chris Hables Gray

[ 62 ] The Present
the simulators (J. R. Wilson, 1988, pp. 1127-1129). While simulators were
used extensively to prepare the soldiers who fought in the Persian Gulf, some
experts complain that simulators don't take human factors into account, nor
the mentality of the enemy (Sugawara, 1990).
The quest in ongoing for "synthetic environments" and "seamless
simulation." Sometimes the strategy is to work backward. The U.S. Army
and ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) have created an incredibly
accurate simulation of the Battle of 75 Easting from the Gulf War, where
the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment fought the Tawakalna Division of the
Iraqi Republican Guard. The military claims, justifiably it seems, that this
battle is the most accurately recorded combat engagement in human history.
Bruce Sterling calls the simulation a "complete and utter triumph of chilling
analytic, cybernetic rationality over chaotic, real life human desperation."
He concludes that it is 'Virtual reality as a new way of knowledge: a new and
terrible kind of transcendent military power" (Sterling, 1993, p. 52). But as
impressive an experience as it is, will it really help U.S. soldiers fight better
in other kinds of battles?
The most ambitious simulation since the SDI test bed is the Air
Force's project to design air combat simulators with intelligent artificial
agents participating equally with humans on simulators. Despite the
traditional early enthusiasm, the program seems bedeviled by problems.
Yet the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army can still claim in 1995 that the
combination of live, virtual, and constructive simulations means that
any option conceivable can be simulated (Sullivan, 1995, p. 10). The
real problem is not simulator quality anyway, nor finding opponents to
play with. The real problem is knowing what to practice for in postmodern
war.
C 4 I 2 (Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, and Interoperability)
Adm. William A. Owens (1995) is right when he argues that this is now
a system of systems, linking 14 major sensor systems through 14 major
C 4 I 2 nets to 14 precision-guided munitions. But while there have been
remarkable increases in communications technology, there are still many
operational failures (Gilmartin, 1987, p. 11; Marcus and Leopold, 1987;
Wolfe, 1985), going back to the Worldwide Military Command and
Control System (WWMCCS, pronounced "WIMEX"). Theodore
Roszak reports:
WIMEX is a global network of sensors, satellites, and computer facilities
that ties together twenty-six major American command centers around
the world. Since the mid-1970s, WIMEX has been the subject of frequent