entire book - Chris Hables Gray

Military Computerdom [ 59 ]
Intelligence (Cryptology, Surveillance, Image and Sound Analysis,
Satellite Control, Database Management)
The greatest and clearest successes of advanced computing are in this area.
Computers are for handling information above all. While shrouded in
secrecy, CIA and NSA code breaking is reputed to be quite successful,
especially against the poorer countries and companies. Sound and image
surveillance (using various spectrums, including some that can probe more
than 60 feet into the ground) is also a crucial source of accurate intelligence.
Current systems are totally dependent on advanced computer techniques,
including sorting of target data, enhancement of sounds and images, and the
control of satellites and other collection platforms. However, there have been
some serious computer problems at the Consolidated Space Test Center, the
Blue Cube (S. Johnson, 1988). Most importantly, U.S. intelligence analysts
have failed again and again to predict major events such as the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Tet offensive, the collapse of communism,
and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. No matter how much information machines
collect, it is useless unless it is understood.
Autonomous Weapons (Shoot 'n' Scoot, Fire 'n' Forget, Sell-Contained
Launch-and-Leave First-Pass Single-Shot Kills)
While truly autonomous weapons are still in the distant future, so-called
smart weapons, which follow carefully programmed instructions to find
targets that they then compare to stored images, did work in the Gulf War,
especially the Tomahawk cruise missiles launched by the Navy. But, since
they needed individual programming and carried only a limited pay load, they
were useful only on very short lists of targets. The British deployed autonomous
weapons with limited success during the Falkland War (Military Technology
Staff, 1987, p. 52). The Sea Wolf antiaircraft system in particular had
many computer problems, including resetting itself when confronted with
multiple targets (Hastings and Jenkins 1989).
Teleoperated (remote-controlled) systems have had a somewhat better
record. Israeli drones have proved very valuable in drawing antiaircraft fire.
After many expensive failures going back to Vietnam, remote piloted vehicles
(RPVs) had moderate success during the Gulf War directing battleship
guns and Marine Corps artillery (Frantz, 1991). Still, the U.S. high-tech
drone programs, bedeviled by failures and cost overruns (M. Thompson,
1988) have never been as successful as the Israeli low-tech approach (Hellman,
1987).
The U.S. Army bought a whole "family of three types of unmanned air
vehicles" even though a fly-off between two vehicles (one from California
Microwave and the other from Lear Siegler's Developmental Science Corp.)