entire book - Chris Hables Gray
entire book - Chris Hables Gray
entire book - Chris Hables Gray
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[ 234 ] The Future<br />
every sort, such strength that the appalling costs of preparation can be<br />
paid without wrecking the system that produces them, such mounting<br />
strength that armed prosperity can proceed to more arms and more<br />
prosperity, (p. 120)<br />
Bush became a central proponent of preparedness and of militarized science,<br />
although with many reservations. His was probably the mainstream response,<br />
but not all computer scientists agreed with him. Two of the most important<br />
"fathers" of computation, John von Neumann and Norbert Wiener, both of<br />
Hungarian-Jewish descent, took substantially different positions from Bush<br />
toward science and war, Wiener was almost a pacifist while von Neumann<br />
was particularly prowar. Comparing their postwar careers we can see how<br />
antiwar scientists have been marginalized politically even as their discoveries<br />
were being applied militarily whereas prowar scientists have been integrated<br />
into the highest levels of political power while claiming to be nothing more<br />
than objective experts without politics. 2<br />
When von Neumann was invited to join the FAS board he declined,<br />
claiming to have avoided "all participation in public activities, which are not<br />
of a purely technical nature." When invited again he wrote, "I do not want<br />
to appear in public in a not primarily technical context" (quoted in Heims,<br />
1980, p. 235). This is the man who in arguing for the hydrogen bomb the<br />
year before had said, "I don't think any weapon can be too large" (p. 236).<br />
Even as early as 1946 he went out of his way to view the first postwar atomic<br />
tests, Operation Crossroad, which FAS objected strenuously to. He was<br />
hardly adverse to shaping military-political policy either: he met with Teller<br />
"immediately after they learned the news of the Soviet [atomic] bomb and<br />
discussed not whether but how to get political backing for an accelerated<br />
superbomb program" (pp. 240-247).<br />
Norbert Wiener, the founder of the field of cybernetics, did substantial<br />
war work at MIT, but by the end of World War II he had decided that he<br />
would refrain from any further research with military applications. At the<br />
end of 1946 he said, "I do not expect to publish any future work of mine<br />
which may do damage in the hands of irresponsible militarists" (p. 208).<br />
By 1950 von Neumann was advocating preventive war. "If you say why<br />
not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at five o'clock,<br />
I say why not one o'clock?" (p. 247) In the early 1950s he chaired the<br />
committee that justified the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles<br />
(ICBMs), starting with the Atlas.<br />
Steven Heims, whose fascinating double biography of Wiener and von<br />
Neumann is subtitled From Mathematics to the Technologies of Life and Death,<br />
concludes that this was a "deep failure":<br />
On their own terms, the Atlas missile and its successors were greatly<br />
successful, like the hydrogen bomb before them. But when one recognizes,