entire book - Chris Hables Gray

Military Computerdom [ 69 ]
The reality of the nine months of simulated battles displaced, overrode,
absorbed the reality of the Airbus. The Airbus disappeared before the
missile struck: it faded from an airliner full of civilians to an electronic
representation on a radar screen to a simulated target. The simulation
overpowered a reality which did not conform to it. (Der Derian, 1990, p.
302)
The most significant single cause of the shooting down of Flight 655
seems to be that in the stress of their combat situation the crew of the
Vincennes interpreted all information as confirmation that Flight 655 was a
threat, even when that involved directly misreading the data supplied by the
Aegis. Aegis itself provided the rationale for sending the Vincennes into the
Persian Gulf, and because of Aegis she was given very liberal rules of
engagement. Since Vincennes had the Aegis, the Sides did not challenge her
identification of Flight 655 as an F-14. Having the Aegis gave the captain
and crew of the Vincennes the confidence and ability to shoot down the
Iranian airliner, but not the ability to see it was actually nonthreatening, nor
the confidence to risk that it was hostile.
That computers can change human decision making has been ignored
by many analysts, although there is a growing understanding of its importance
(Winograd and Flores, 1986). In military terms it has already led to a
number of significant errors:
The preoccupation with computerization dominates military technology,
which in turn dominates military thinking, which itself dominates foreign
policy, i.e., international politics. This is because our political leaders, our
government bureaucracies, and much of the general public take for
granted that superior computer technology guarantees superior military
technology. In turn it is assumed that superior military technology guarantees
superior military power, and that superior military power guarantees
political effectiveness on the international scene in the pursuit and
protection of our national interests. (Ladd, 1987, pp. 298-299)
The Aegis gave the Vincennes' captain and crew the illusion that they
knew more than they did. It is an illusion that is not unique. Writ large it is
U.S. military—and therefore technoscience—policy.