entire book - Chris Hables Gray
entire book - Chris Hables Gray
entire book - Chris Hables Gray
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[ 76 ] The Present<br />
and inhuman objects not only doesn't explain how social knowledge is<br />
constructed but implicitly supports the politics of science as it is.<br />
A stronger and more useful way of explaining the importance of artifacts<br />
is to see them as playing special roles within a discourse. In science, artifacts<br />
and experiments are powerful metaphors, arguments, sometimes even rules, of<br />
the discourse. They are never, however, acting subjects. Within the workings<br />
of discourse, then, a machine or an experiment is not neutral—it has "politics,"<br />
for example (Winner, 1986). It influences reality by influencing how people<br />
think and decide (Aronowitz, 1988). In sum, then, science can be seen as both<br />
a discourse and a practice mediating between human culture and the real world<br />
on physical, psychological, and even emotional levels.<br />
Seen in another way, however, science is a religion, an ideology, even a<br />
cult. Although other social systems can manifest powers of demonstration<br />
(miracles), prediction (prophesy), and experience (the subjective one of the<br />
believers), none approach science in its demonstrative, predictive, and<br />
experimental powers on the physical plane—that part of reality most easily<br />
visited (captured?) by science. Science kills. Science saves. Science intervenes<br />
continuously in our lives.<br />
This stress on intervention as characterizing science is developed in the<br />
philosopher Ian Hacking's work. He points out that the central characteristic<br />
of science is the ability to make regular "interventions," which can be<br />
experiments or observations that produce regular phenomena (1983). The<br />
theoretical side of science, representation, not only tries to explain these<br />
interventions, in some cases it can organize them as well. Thus the phenomena<br />
are produced by both the theoretical and actual human intervention into<br />
the material. The process continues as representations influence interventions<br />
and vice versa.<br />
This is the methodology of AI: proof by production not by repeatable<br />
experiment. It is also, by necessity, the way a science of war must proceed,<br />
for every battle is different. But what must be produced as proof? Victory?<br />
Security? A strong military? War? The confusion is because experiments<br />
don't produce proofs so much as definitions. The science of war defines wars,<br />
but it can't promise to win them.<br />
There is something potent in science. There is powerful magic in<br />
the regularity with which science can mine (find, define) facts. The<br />
power of nuclear weapons, moon trips, and open heart surgery has meant<br />
a very special place for science in modern culture. This effectiveness of<br />
science may well be integral to human nature and culture as they have<br />
evolved up to this day, having more to do with survival than with truth.<br />
Science works on more than it explains—which explains some of the<br />
ways it has shaped war.<br />
Even if a scientific (experimental, pragmatic, reductionistic) mentality<br />
isn't a necessary part of being human today, science is just too central to be