Stirring Up a Hornet's Nest: - UGA Laboratory of Archaeology ...

Pickens (1811) statement that “Boyd being (of British Practices) advanced immediately with a party of men
through the field to the edge of the woods and concealing them behind old trees which had fallen down and
an old fence - The main body was drown [drawn] up along the edge of the (cane) creek which came in
circular from round on the right” is informative. It indicates that once Colonel Boyd realized that his men
were under attack, he formed a formal battle line as dictated by British Army practice. This line of troops
advanced northward to meet Colonel Pickens’ men, probably firing volleys in a rigid formation. Boyd’s
men quickly shifted their strategy and sought cover behind natural and cultural features (uprooted trees and
a fence line). From their concealed positions, the Loyalists would have been able to fire rifles, as well as
smoothbore muskets, at the Patriots. Many of the men encountered by Pickens at this phase of battle were
probably the 100 or so Loyalist soldiers that Boyd had at his immediate disposal. Their position was likely
at Locus B in the present survey.
While Colonel Boyd was still in command, he and his troops began their retreat. Pickens recalled in 1811:
“We were within thirty yards before they fired or we discovered them as they lay flat on the ground. They
immediately fled down through the cleared ground to their main body.” According to Pickens, it was
during their flight that Colonel Boyd received his mortal wounds, “Fortunately for us, when Boyd had run
about 100 yards, three balls passed through him” (Pickens 1811).
The rest of Boyd’s men were scattered and in the cane break when the attack began. Pickens’ reference to
the rest of Boyd’s men as coming “in circular round from the right” means that these Loyalists were down
in the Kettle Creek floodplain, west of Colonel Pickens’ men and probably directly down slope for Colonel
Dooly’s advancing horsemen.
The cane break offered concealment for the Loyalists, many of whom were without their horses and were
not well organized in any particular battle order. Pickens’ grandson later quoted his grandfather (whom the
grandson never knew) as saying the enemy “galled us much out of the canes,” referring to the gunfire from
the Loyalists who were visibly hidden from within the canebrake (Pickens 1937:44).
The canebrake was an impediment for both Colonel Dooly and Colonel Clarke’s men. Colonel Clarke’s
men were probably less impeded by the canebrake (and by the Loyalists), which would partly account for
Clarke’s detachment’s ability to cross Kettle Creek before either Colonel Pickens’ or Colonel Dooly’s men.
Clarke himself, however, was the target of enemy fire, since more than one participant describe him having
his horse shot from under him.
The archeological potential for the canebrake was not determined by the present survey. This area presents
two major challenges. First, the creek channel was straightened beginning in 1918 and portions of Kettle
Creek no longer follow its original course. The process of channelizing the stream was accomplished by
piling the dredge spoil on both banks of the new creek channel. This resulted in a long, new levee and this
overburden likely obscures some original stream bank deposits that may contain battlefield debris. The
dredge spoil also may contain battle artifacts but these are redeposited from their origin deposition.
Secondly, the Kettle Creek floodplain has accumulated as much as one meter of sediment since 1779. This
thick mantle of overburden prohibited the effective use of metal detectors in these soils. Those metal
objects that were detected in the former canebrake were of modern age. While this area may yet contain
important buried battlefield artifacts, their location would require extensive excavation which was beyond
the scope of the present study.
The balance of Colonel Boyd’s men, who were separated from Colonel Boyd, did not join up with Boyd.
Many of them may have fired a few volleys at the Patriots but they were in a vulnerable position and they
soon fled to the south side of Kettle Creek. Their exodus was probably accompanied by a great deal of
confusion. The south side of Kettle Creek offers a larger area of floodplain than does the north side and
quite possibly, most of Boyd’s men may have already been on that side of the creek. None of the battle
accounts mention any retrograde movement by the Loyalists from the south to the north, across the rainswollen
creek. Thus, while some Loyalists were probably drawn to Boyd’s aid, especially those who were
located nearby at the time of the attack, most were not. Had they all formed as a single unit, the battle
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