Stirring Up a Hornet's Nest: - UGA Laboratory of Archaeology ...

might have turned in their favor. Once Boyd was incapacitated by his wounds and unable to command, the
group cohesion of the Loyalists around him deteriorated and they fled in panic. Since Dooly’s and Clarke’s
troops surrounded them to the east and west and Pickens men were to the north, southward across Kettle
Creek was their only option.
Pickens recalled, “The action then became general and (warm) confused for about twenty minutes, they
called for us much out of the cover,” which suggests that the Loyalists stayed in the canebrake for some
time before crossing Kettle Creek. Pickens was frustrated that Dooly’s and Clarke’s men were stalled in the
canebrake as he later wrote, “The divisions on the flank did not press as I wished them to cross the creek
above and below. This was not for want of courage but for want of experience and knowledge of the
necessity of obeying orders” (Pickens 1811). Pickens went on to say that the Loyalists “retreated across the
creek and formed on a rising ground. We pressed though the cane, the action was renewed mor[e]
obstinately and continued near half an hour - As they had the advantage of the grounds they contended
obstinately but at length gave way” (Pickens 1811). In his account Pickens does not give Elijah Clarke any
credit for being the first to cross the creek or engage in the final phase of the battle. The place where the
Loyalists had “the advantage of the grounds” was at Locus F in the present survey.
Figure 45 is a schematic diagram of the suspected firing positions and troop movements of the Patriots and
Loyalists in the battle at Kettle Creek. This version of the battle is derived from a synthetic analysis of the
historical and archeological research conducted as part of this study.
The present study examined most of the areas confined within McDaniel’s study area (McDaniel 2002a).
This encompassed many hectares, however, and the fieldwork lasted only 10 days with a small field crew,
so the coverage was not 100 percent. This work constitutes a reconnaissance survey of the entire battlefield
with specific areas receiving more focused scrutiny. Many areas were identified that are relevant to the
battle, which confirmed that McDaniel’s battlefield size estimate was relatively accurate.
Defining Battlefield Features are the essential components in Battlefield Archeology for an accurate
interpretive reconstruction of a historic battle. These features are tangible. They include natural
topographic features, cultural improvements such as farms, roads, fences, mills, agricultural fields, etc.
(existing at the time of the battle), military barricades, entrenchments, or fortifications, fields of fire,
cemeteries, and other associated geographically definable features. Defining Battlefield Features for the
Kettle Creek battlefield included:
� Kettle Creek (Channelized but largely the same as shown on modern maps)
� Canebrake or Swamp (Bottoms between Loci E, C, B, F, and H)
� Monument Knoll (Loci A and B)
� Hill on south side of Kettle Creek (Locus F)
� Fence line on knoll slope (not located)
� Archibald Simpson’s (or Mr. Nelson’s) farmstead (not located)
� James Hammett’s farmstead (Locus E)
� Simpson’s (or Nelson’s) Cow pen (possibly between Loci C and E)
� Loyalists camp (Locus E)
� Wrightsborough Road (Locus F)
� Road to Carr’s Station (Locus D)
� Road to Heard’s Fort (Locus D)
� Joel Phillip’s Fort (not located)
� Slaton’s Mill seat (not located)
� Robert McNabb’s Fort (not located)
� McGirth’s camp on Little River (not located)
� Battlefield graveyard (not located)
� Ford across Kettle Creek (between Loci A and F)
The battle at Kettle Creek lasted less than three hours but the participants, who were on horseback and on
foot, covered considerable distances over the course of the battle. The result is that the battlefield is spread
over several hundred hectares. Following ABPP survey protocol the results of the present historical
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