Flugten til Sverige. Aktionen mod de danske jøder oktober 1943 - DIIS

sted by the Germans in October. The guards not only drew the line at merely
turning a blind eye to the evacuation, in many cases they helped the Jews and
took an active part in the organisation of the transports. This gave the illegal
crossings an air of legality and encouraged many other volunteers to offer their
help. Another contributory factor was the particular treatment given to the
volunteers who were arrested. Thus, the German authorities accepted the Danish
authorities’ mild treatment of those caught and it therefore also seems very likely
that many volunteers became aware that helping the Jews to Sweden carried a
very small risk. Unlike the situation in other occupying
countries, they did not risk their lives. It was quite simply not considered to be a
serious offence. The maximum penalty was three months’ imprisonment, but
many got off more lightly or were not
punished at all.The timing of the action was also a decisive factor for the massive
rescue mission. It was carried out at a time when the policy of collaboration had
ended and the hostility towards the occupying forces was mounting, which
meant that the Jews received the support and help which they needed. The
assistance offered by the Danish coastal and naval police forces during the mass
exodus followed the collapse on 29th August. Had the action against the Jews
been launched in, for instance, 1942, the result would probably have been a
different one. The Danes would have been more reluctant to offer their help, and
Sweden, guarding its neutrality, would have been unlikely to receive several
thousand Jews.The most important factor behind the success of the Jewish mass
exodus was, however, the fact that the Germans did not carry out a systematic
hunt for the Jews following the action on 1st October. Even though the Germans
were aware that the Danish coastal and naval police did not interfere with the
Jewish exodus, the Germans only used a small number of their own officers. The
German navy did not engage in police surveillance of the Sound in October. As a
result not a single crossing out of the 600-700 made with Jewish refugees was
halted on its way to Sweden. The Wehrmacht could have stopped the escape of
all those Jews. However, soldiers were only deployed in a few cases following
requests from the German security forces. Throughout the mass exodus 1,300-
1,400 German uniformed policemen were stationed in Copenhagen. Had this
efficient force been in