Is it necessary to install a downhole safety valve in a subsea ... - NTNU
Is it necessary to install a downhole safety valve in a subsea ... - NTNU
Is it necessary to install a downhole safety valve in a subsea ... - NTNU
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
<strong>Is</strong> <strong>it</strong> <strong>necessary</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong><strong>in</strong>stall</strong> a <strong>downhole</strong> <strong>safety</strong> <strong>valve</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>subsea</strong> oil/gas well?<br />
5 Risk reduc<strong>in</strong>g effect of a DHSV<br />
The presence of a <strong>downhole</strong> <strong>safety</strong> <strong>valve</strong> (DHSV) shall reduce the risk of blowout <strong>in</strong> a <strong>subsea</strong><br />
production well. In this chapter, the risk reduc<strong>in</strong>g effect of a DHSV is found. A case study of a<br />
<strong>subsea</strong> production well is <strong>in</strong>cluded as an illustrative example. A comparison of unavailabil<strong>it</strong>y<br />
calculations for a well w<strong>it</strong>h, and w<strong>it</strong>hout a DHSV proves the pos<strong>it</strong>ive effect of the DHSV<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g production. Barrier diagrams and fault trees are constructed <strong>to</strong> provide a basis for the<br />
calculations and illustrate the leakage paths.<br />
5.1 Case example<br />
The studied well is composed out of standard well components. A technical description of the<br />
different components is given <strong>in</strong> appendix A. The study is lim<strong>it</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> the <strong>downhole</strong> and x-mas<br />
tree configurations; <strong>to</strong>pside equipment, manifolds and riser systems are not <strong>in</strong>cluded.<br />
To be able <strong>to</strong> calculate the risk w<strong>it</strong>h and w<strong>it</strong>hout a DHSV <strong>in</strong> the well, the well lifetime is<br />
assumed <strong>to</strong> be 15 years. This generates <strong>in</strong> most cases a conservative value for the non-tested<br />
barriers. Periodic test<strong>in</strong>g is carried out <strong>to</strong> reveal hidden failures <strong>in</strong> the system. For <strong>safety</strong><br />
reasons the most cr<strong>it</strong>ical functions, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the DHSV, are tested every 6 months. Other parts<br />
of the system are not tested.<br />
The tested functions are:<br />
Clos<strong>in</strong>g, open<strong>in</strong>g and leak tight function of the DHSV<br />
Clos<strong>in</strong>g, open<strong>in</strong>g and leak tight function of the master <strong>valve</strong><br />
Clos<strong>in</strong>g, open<strong>in</strong>g and leak tight function of the production w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>valve</strong><br />
5.1.1 Production tree<br />
The production tree <strong>in</strong> the example is a horizontal tree, as illustrated <strong>in</strong> Figure 5-1. A<br />
production tree is an assembly of <strong>valve</strong>s. It provides control of the well flow dur<strong>in</strong>g production<br />
and is capable, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, of cutt<strong>in</strong>g of the flow from the reservoir.<br />
In the risk assessment the failure modes, external leakage (EXL), fail <strong>to</strong> close (FTC), <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
leakage (ITL) and leakage <strong>in</strong> closed pos<strong>it</strong>ion (LCP) are considered for the different <strong>valve</strong>s.<br />
Diploma thesis, <strong>NTNU</strong> 2002<br />
17