Is it necessary to install a downhole safety valve in a subsea ... - NTNU
Is it necessary to install a downhole safety valve in a subsea ... - NTNU
Is it necessary to install a downhole safety valve in a subsea ... - NTNU
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<strong>Is</strong> <strong>it</strong> <strong>necessary</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong><strong>in</strong>stall</strong> a <strong>downhole</strong> <strong>safety</strong> <strong>valve</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>subsea</strong> oil/gas well?<br />
5.3 Fault Tree Analysis<br />
The construction of the fault trees is based on the theory given <strong>in</strong> [8].<br />
Fault tree analysis is a deductive technique that focuses on a particular unwanted system event<br />
and provides a method for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g causes for that event. A risk analysis often <strong>in</strong>cludes the<br />
fault tree analysis technique for evaluation of the <strong>in</strong>dividual component failure modes and their<br />
impact on the system reliabil<strong>it</strong>y.<br />
The fault tree is constructed w<strong>it</strong>h the use of different logic gates and displays the<br />
<strong>in</strong>terrelationships between a potential cr<strong>it</strong>ical event <strong>in</strong> a system and the reasons for this event.<br />
The ma<strong>in</strong> logic elements are the ‘TOP’-event, the ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ gates, and the basic events.<br />
The comb<strong>in</strong>ation of the basic events and the system structure determ<strong>in</strong>es whether or not the<br />
‘TOP’-event will occur.<br />
The fault tree provides a static picture of the comb<strong>in</strong>ations of failures and events that may cause a<br />
‘TOP’-event <strong>to</strong> occur. Fault tree analysis, as barrier diagrams, is thus not a su<strong>it</strong>able technique for<br />
analys<strong>in</strong>g dynamic systems.<br />
5.3.1 Case example<br />
In the case example the ‘TOP’-event is “leakage <strong>to</strong> the surround<strong>in</strong>gs”. The ‘TOP’-event occurs<br />
e<strong>it</strong>her if there is a “leakage <strong>to</strong> the surround<strong>in</strong>gs from the x-mas tree” or “leakage <strong>to</strong> the<br />
surround<strong>in</strong>gs from the wellhead”. A more concise def<strong>in</strong><strong>it</strong>ion of the ‘TOP’ event is:<br />
“Susta<strong>in</strong>able leakage <strong>to</strong> the surround<strong>in</strong>gs through e<strong>it</strong>her the x-mas tree or the wellhead dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
normal shut-<strong>in</strong> cond<strong>it</strong>ions.” This ‘TOP' event covers s<strong>it</strong>uations where the barrier comb<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
<strong>in</strong> one or more cut sets have failed.<br />
The different components of the production well presented <strong>in</strong> subsection 5.1.2, are represent<br />
basic events <strong>in</strong> the fault trees. The barrier diagrams, of subsection 5.2.1, provide the basis for<br />
the fault tree construction. In order <strong>to</strong> simplify the construction of the fault tree, external stress<br />
and common cause failures are not <strong>in</strong>cluded.<br />
The fault trees constructed for the oil/gas production well w<strong>it</strong>h and w<strong>it</strong>hout a DHSV are<br />
presented <strong>in</strong> appendix C. The CARA-fault tree program is used <strong>in</strong> the construction.<br />
Diploma thesis, <strong>NTNU</strong> 2002<br />
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