A Judge’s Guide

abduction, and/or dispute of child custody. 61 Batterers’ willingness to use their children as
bargaining chips has produced the term “custody blackmail” to describe the revenge motives
evidenced during and after separation. 62 Often intimidated, abuse victims are forced to
surrender or compromise custody and support rights, 63 to the detriment of the children.
Empirical research documents that such fears are justified as there is a clear correlation between
the severity of abuse in the course of the marriage and that which continues during and after
divorce. 64 Under the weight of such credible threats, many battered women feel no option but
to agree to waive child support in exchange for custody. 65 An inability to obtain child support
can force abuse victims to seek public assistance, and they may become homeless. 66
Interveners must consider the empirical data indicating that batterers are far more likely to
engage in protracted custody battles, and, generally, are highly litigious as a means of
continuing to assert control over their partners. 67 Sharing children with an abuser puts the
victim at particular risk, as it is quite difficult to sever ties with such a persistent offender. 68 It
is thus evident that the current legal framework affords batterers many opportunities to continue
their abuse in the form of custody, visitation, support, and other litigation.
IV. INTIMIDATION OF CHILD WITNESSES
Many batterers do not hesitate to involve the victim’s children as an effective means of
witness tampering, with devastating impact on the child targets. Perpetrators bribe their
children to lie about witnessing abuse, to choose batterer as the custodial parent, to report on the
mother’s actions, and to relay threats 69 and bribes to the mother. 70 In exchange for the mother
recanting her testimony, batterers also use their children as pawns in custody, visitation, and
child protection cases. 71 Kidnapping the children 72 and engaging in criminal custodial
61 See Domestic Violence and Child Custody, supra note 43; see also R.L. Hegar & G.L. Greif, Abduction of
Children By Their Parents: A Survey of the Problem, 36 SOCIAL WORK 421 (1991).
62 Hardesty, supra note 46 at 608.
63 Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.
Q. 273 (1995).
64 See Separation, Divorce, and Woman Abuse supra note 49; see also D. Kurz, FOR RICHER, FOR POOERER:
MOTHERS CONFRONT DIVORCE (1995).
65 See Separation, Divorce, and Woman Abuse supra note 49.
66 M.F. Davis, The Economics of Abuse: How Violence Perpetuates Women’s Poverty, in BATTERED WOMEN,
CHILDREN, AND WELFARE REFORM: THE TIES THAT BIND 17-30 (R.A. Brandwein ed. 1999).
67 Hardesty, supra note 46 at 607 (reporting that abusers exert their need to control in protracted custody battles
and other forms of litigation).
68
L.J. Stalans and A.J. Lurigio, Responding to Domestic Violence Against Women, 41 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 388 (1995).
69
See e.g., People v. Rester, 36 P.3d 98, 100 (Colo. App. 2001) (batterer called his daughter and used her to pass
on a threat to her mother).
70 Attorney Julia Raney, with Texas Rio Grande Legal Aid in Edinburg, Texas, speaking at University of Texas
School of Law Domestic Violence Clinic conference, Feb. 29, 2008 (reporting that in her experience batterers
bribe teens and adult children with promises of a car, money or payments of $200 per week). (hereinafter “Raney
Talk”); see generally, Peter G. Jaffe, Nancy K.D. Lemon, and Samantha E. Poisson, CHILD CUSTODY &
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, A CALL FOR SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2003).
71 See also, State v. Kazulin, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 926 (Wash. App. 2004) (batterer wrote to victim from jail,
threatening to provide evidence that she was an unfit parent.)
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