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A Judge’s Guide

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MANAGING THE CHILD CUSTODY CASE<br />

stating a health care liability claim; the amended pleading was filed after the<br />

date set in the agreed scheduling order entered in accordance with Tex. R. Civ.<br />

P. 166 and Tex. R. Civ. P. 190); G.R.A.V.I.T.Y. Enters v. Reese Supply Co., 177<br />

S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2005, no pet.)(trial court did not err in striking<br />

plaintiff's second amended petition filed 10 days before trial in a breach of<br />

contract case in which the deadline for filing amended pleadings was set by the<br />

trial court's scheduling order. The seven-day deadline of Tex. R. Civ. P. 63 did<br />

not apply when the trial court had entered its scheduling order pursuant to Tex.<br />

R. Civ. P. 166 setting a different deadline.); In re Bledsoe, 41 S.W.3d 807, 812<br />

(Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2001, orig. proceeding)(the “trial court has power,<br />

implicit under rule 166, to sanction a party for failing to obey its pretrial<br />

orders”).<br />

68 th<br />

Bougie v. Tech. Risks, Inc., LEXIS 11282 (Tex. App. – Houston [14 Dist] 2004,<br />

no pet.) held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed<br />

third-party defendants to file amended special appearances after a deadline in<br />

the docket control order. The trial court allowed the late-filed motions to<br />

prevent manifest injustice because the third-party defendants did not have<br />

notice of the deadline; Wil-Roye Inv. Co. II v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 142 S.W.3d<br />

393 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2004, no pet.) held that the trial court did not abuse<br />

its discretion by amending the scheduling order and extending deadlines which<br />

had already passed based on the serious illness of the lead counsel for appellee<br />

bank. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166 recognizes the fundamental rule that a trial court has<br />

the inherent right to change or modify any interlocutory order or judgment<br />

until the time the judgment on the merits in the case becomes final.<br />

69<br />

Tex. Rule of Evidence 403 provides that “relevant, evidence may be excluded if<br />

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the . . . needless presentation<br />

of cumulative evidence.”<br />

70<br />

Hamilton v. Morrris Res., Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2007,<br />

pet.denied) held the “exclusion of an exhibit not listed in a pretrial order is not<br />

an impermissible sanction.”<br />

71<br />

RESOURCES GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 19.<br />

72 Id. at 20.<br />

73 Id.<br />

74 Id.<br />

75 Id.<br />

76 Id.<br />

77 Id. at 21.<br />

78 Id.<br />

79 Id.<br />

30

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