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GLOB.IDEALIZATION MOND.IDÉALISATION - Faculty of Social ...

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Verónica Rubio Vega | Post-crisis Responses and Prospects in Latin America<br />

themselves or international financiers. 25 But how has this institution<br />

responded to these criticisms and to the increasing demand for more<br />

flexibility – or even for radical changes – in their prescriptive agendas? There<br />

have been two main developments related to the IMF and its current role in<br />

global governance: the return <strong>of</strong> the IMF to centre stage and ideological and<br />

internal practical reforms at the institution. Prior to 2007, the majority <strong>of</strong><br />

South American economies, benefiting from high commodity prices and<br />

growing currency reserves, had reduced their exposure to the IMF. 26<br />

However, having been pushed to the margins in recent years, a number <strong>of</strong><br />

Latin American countries have reconsidered their relationship with the Fund.<br />

For example, the Fund has created a new credit facility, the flexible<br />

credit line (FCL), through which countries with sound fundamentals are able<br />

27<br />

to borrow reserves without having to satisfy onerous conditions. The FCL<br />

can be used both on a precautionary (crisis prevention) and nonprecautionary<br />

(crisis resolution) basis. Potentially more important in terms <strong>of</strong><br />

the IMF’s institutional legitimacy, however, is that the IMF consulted<br />

emerging market economies in the process <strong>of</strong> developing the new FCL. 28<br />

Yet, it remains to be seen whether the FCL can accomplish the goal that<br />

previous credit lines like the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) could not<br />

achieve. Governments in the region may hesitate to apply to the FLC for the<br />

25 Chin, Gregory T. “Remaking the Architecture: The Emerging Powers, Self-insuring and<br />

Regional Insulation.” International Affairs 86.3 (2010): 693-715. Print. p. 697.<br />

26 Chin 705.<br />

27 For details, see ‘Factsheet: The IMF’s Flexible Credit Line’ (2011)<br />

28 The IMF – Mission: Impossible. Economist.com, The Economist. April 2009. Web. 1 Dec.<br />

2010. line 91.<br />

Glob.Idealization |160

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