GLOB.IDEALIZATION MOND.IDÉALISATION - Faculty of Social ...
GLOB.IDEALIZATION MOND.IDÉALISATION - Faculty of Social ...
GLOB.IDEALIZATION MOND.IDÉALISATION - Faculty of Social ...
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Verónica Rubio Vega | Post-crisis Responses and Prospects in Latin America<br />
themselves or international financiers. 25 But how has this institution<br />
responded to these criticisms and to the increasing demand for more<br />
flexibility – or even for radical changes – in their prescriptive agendas? There<br />
have been two main developments related to the IMF and its current role in<br />
global governance: the return <strong>of</strong> the IMF to centre stage and ideological and<br />
internal practical reforms at the institution. Prior to 2007, the majority <strong>of</strong><br />
South American economies, benefiting from high commodity prices and<br />
growing currency reserves, had reduced their exposure to the IMF. 26<br />
However, having been pushed to the margins in recent years, a number <strong>of</strong><br />
Latin American countries have reconsidered their relationship with the Fund.<br />
For example, the Fund has created a new credit facility, the flexible<br />
credit line (FCL), through which countries with sound fundamentals are able<br />
27<br />
to borrow reserves without having to satisfy onerous conditions. The FCL<br />
can be used both on a precautionary (crisis prevention) and nonprecautionary<br />
(crisis resolution) basis. Potentially more important in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
the IMF’s institutional legitimacy, however, is that the IMF consulted<br />
emerging market economies in the process <strong>of</strong> developing the new FCL. 28<br />
Yet, it remains to be seen whether the FCL can accomplish the goal that<br />
previous credit lines like the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) could not<br />
achieve. Governments in the region may hesitate to apply to the FLC for the<br />
25 Chin, Gregory T. “Remaking the Architecture: The Emerging Powers, Self-insuring and<br />
Regional Insulation.” International Affairs 86.3 (2010): 693-715. Print. p. 697.<br />
26 Chin 705.<br />
27 For details, see ‘Factsheet: The IMF’s Flexible Credit Line’ (2011)<br />
28 The IMF – Mission: Impossible. Economist.com, The Economist. April 2009. Web. 1 Dec.<br />
2010. line 91.<br />
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