Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

collectively. Neither is it true of any man that he will not do as well as he can. There is no can-be that never
will be. No man is under a necessity to sin either collectively or individually, neither is any man perfectly
certain to do so. But the probability of doing right every time an opportunity is given, is so small that so far
a man of mature age who has through his whole life been perfectly sinless has not come within the sphere
of observation.
It has been seen that it is most reasonable to suppose that a man of mature age will have made 100
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different free volitions; also that the chance of his doing right every time is between 1 in 2 and 1 in 6 ,
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although the values of 2 and 6 have been given, however, the exceeding smallness of the probability
thus expressed may not at first sight strike the mind. To present it more forcibly, let us observe that one
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bears about the same relation to 2 that a grain of sand does to the whole volume of the earth; and one
100
is many million million million times smaller in comparison with 6 than the smallest animalcule, a million
of which may live in one drop of water, is in comparison with the sun and all the visible fixed stars, supposing
the sun to be 1,400,000 times as large as the earth, and each fixed star to be a million times as large as the
sun. 270
Why is it that every man sins? Because of his depravity, say some; because he has inherited a sinful
nature. But depravity, or an inherited sinful nature, is not sin in the restricted sense of the term. Says Dr.
Ralston, "God must look upon sin as sin, and upon righteousness as righteousness, wherever they are
found. It would therefore follow, that the posterity of Adam, having never personally transgressed, cannot
be viewed as personally guilty. The personal act of Adam cannot be imputed to them as their personal act.
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It never was theirs personally, nor can it by any fiction of law be so considered." And, as depravity is not
sin (personal sin), so it is not the cause of sin; for sin, as we have seen, has and can have no cause except
the sentient being who commits it. Whatever is caused or necessitated in me is not my sin. Neither is
depravity an inducement to sin to such an extent as to render it certain; for to render a thing certain is the
same thing as to necessitate it. And really, as has been seen, there is no inducement to a sinful choice but
the thing to be chosen, and in every case the opposite choice is just as probable, for the agent has just as
much power to make it. Depravity, then, does not answer the question why it is that every man actually
personally sins.
Dr. Whedon says, "Our position is that a hereditary depravity introduced into our nature,
necessitating us to sin, however demoralizing it may be, is not responsible or guilty. The question then may
arise, In what manner, and how far, may our natural depravity be by us personally so appropriated as that
we can be held therefore accountable? The obvious answer is, That it is by our own free personal
acceptance of it, and just so far as that acceptance extends. As, for what a man freely chooses to do, so for
what he chooses to be, he is liable to a just account. To these views difficulties are objected, by none more
ably than by Dr. Julius Muller in his Doctrine of Sin, whose views will be taken into consideration in our
following remarks.
Dr. Muller asks: "Could the volition which appropriates the guilt of our depravity be withheld? If so,
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how comes it that guilt and sin are absolutely universal?" To which Dr. Whedon replies, "But of the sin
which appropriates the sin of our nature, our axiomatic principles require us to affirm that it is free and
avoidable. Yet back of that freedom we admit that there is a NECESSITY that insures that, sooner or later,
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the free act of appropriation will be made."
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Says a friend of mine, "I should call that nothing, and be done with it."
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Elements of Divinity, Part I., Chapter XI., p. 128.
Will, p. 333.
Ibid., p. 339.
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