Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

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time is an eternal present. "`The eternal existence of God,' it is said, ìs not to be considered as successive: the ideas we gain from time are not to be allowed in our conceptions of his duration. As he fills all space with his immensity, he fills all duration with his eternity; and with him eternity is nunc stans, a permanent now, 157 incapable of the relations of past, present, and future.'" How such a doctrine can be used to account for the foreknowledge of free volitions, or, as it is commonly said, the foreknowledge of contingencies, does not readily appear. It seems rather to deny the existence of foreknowledge altogether. "This notion is," says Dr. Whedon, "that there is `no succession of time to the divine mind,' `no fore-knowledge or after-knowledge,' but that all is àn eternal now.'" 158 But "an eternal now" is a contradiction in terms. The only idea that we have of eternity is that it is an endless succession of moments. "By repeating the idea of any length of duration," says Locke, "with all the endless addition of number, we come by the idea of eternity." But now means the present moment, a mere point of time between the past and the future. Of course it is entirely without succession. "An eternal now," therefore, if we attach any meaning whatever to the expression, is an endless succession which is not a succession--a repetition of lengths of duration which is entirely without length. But "how can any man conceive a permanent instant, which coexists with a perpetually flowing duration? One might as well 159 apprehend a mathematical point coextended with a line, a surface, and all dimensions." "We do not, indeed," says Dr. Whedon, "know what Edwards means by saying that eternity, the èternity of God's existence,' for instance, is his `possession of the whole of his unlimited life, together and at once.' We can no more conceive how eternity can be condensed to an instant than how immensity can be condensed to a point." 160 "The eternal existence of God," it is said, "is not to be considered as successive." Then it is not an eternal existence, for the word eternal implies succession in the very meaning of the term. Will it be said that this is not its meaning as applied to God? Then it has no meaning at all. No definition has ever been given of eternity by which it does not imply succession, and certainly a word that does not convey to our minds the idea corresponding to some definition of it conveys no idea whatever. In any view of the matter, therefore, an eternal unsuccessive existence, or an eternal now, is a meaningless absurdity. It is a mere collocation of words to which there is no corresponding idea. But suppose that it should be thought that the existence of God is not successive, that he is, therefore, not eternal in the ordinary sense of the term. This would have no bearing whatever on the question of foreknowledge. When we speak of the foreknowledge or after knowledge of God, we refer, not so much to any succession in the knowledge, as to the succession of the events which are known. Suppose, for instance, that an event happens to some human being to-day, and that God had knowledge of that event at the beginning of creation. His knowledge, whether successive or unsuccessive, was evidently the same then that it is now (that is, it was the same cognizance of the event), and will continue to be the same forever. But before the event it was called foreknowledge, during the event it is called concomitant knowledge, and after the event it will be called after knowledge. It is the happening of the event in time, then, that makes the distinction. It is the succession of the event, rather than succession in the knowledge, to which we refer by the use of the terms fore and after. Suppose, then, that God is above the conditions of time; as fore and after refer, not to God, but to the event, and as this is within the conditions of time, the question of foreknowledge or after knowledge is not in the least affected. 157 Watson's Institutes, Part II., Chapter III., p. 202. 158 159 160 Will, p. 290. Watson's Institutes, Part II., Chapter III., p. 202. Will, p. 200. 66
CHAPTER VII: OMNISCIENCE DOES NOT FOREKNOW FREE VOLITIONS. A THEORY used to prove that God can and does foreknow free volitions is that every free action, as well as every necessary event, is, and always was, certain. Hence it is concluded that it is certainly foreknown by Infinite Intelligence. This argument is not difficult to refute. We simply deny the theory, and thus avoid the conclusion. On this point Dr. S. Clarke observes: They who suppose that events, which are called contingent, cannot be certainly foreknown, must likewise suppose that when there is not a chain of necessary causes, there can be no certainty of any future events; but this is a mistake, for let us suppose that there is in man a power of beginning motion, and of acting with what has, of late, been called philosophical freedom; and let us suppose further, that the actions of such a man cannot possibly be foreknown: will there not yet be in the nature of things, notwithstanding this supposition, the same certainty of event in every one of the man's actions, as if they were ever so fatal and necessary? For instance, suppose the man, by an internal principle of motion and an absolute freedom of mind, to do some particular action today, and suppose it was not possible that this action should have been foreseen yesterday; was there not, nevertheless, the same certainty of event as if it had been foreseen, and absolutely necessary? That is, would it not have been as certain a truth yesterday, and from eternity, that this action was an event to be performed to-day, notwithstanding the supposed freedom, as it is now a certain and infallible truth that it is performed? Mere certainty of event, therefore, does not in any measure imply necessity. And surely it implies no contradiction to suppose that every future event which, in the nature of things, is now certain, may now be certainly known by that intelligence which is omniscient. 161 We have here the whole argument before us. First, the assumption, exhibited in the form of questions, that every event is certain, and then the conclusion that Omniscience may therefore certainly know it. Now, we deny this assumption, and maintain that free actions are neither necessary nor certain. First, it is an assumption without a shadow of proof. The questions are asked by Dr. Clarke as if an affirmative answer were the only answer possible--as if the mere statement of the proposition were sufficient to carry conviction to every mind. Secondly, it is not self-evident. So far is it from being so, indeed, that it is contrary to the common notions of mankind. For, notwithstanding all the metaphysical refinement of astute theologians, it seems to be most agreeable to men's intuitions that an event is not certain when, as in the case of a free action, it is possible for it to be otherwise. We answer the questions, then, propounded by Dr. Clarke, as follows: "Will there not yet be the same certainty of event in every one of the man's actions as if they were ever so fatal and necessary?' Not before the actions are performed. Of course if they become the man's actions they will be certain at and after that time; but that does not prove that they were certain before that time, when it was possible for them not to be done. "Was there not, nevertheless, the same certainty of event as if it had been foreseen and absolutely necessary?' By no means. The action is certain now, after it has been performed, but that does not prove that it was certain yesterday. "Would it not have been as certain a truth yesterday and from eternity that this action was an event to be performed to-day, notwithstanding the supposed freedom, as it is now a certain and infallible truth that it is performed?" If it was a truth at all, it was a certain truth. All real truths are certain truths, and one not more so than another. But whether it was a truth or not depends on the meaning of the expression. If it means that "this action was an event" certain "to be performed to-day," it was not; but if it means that "this action was an event," possible "to be performed to-day," it was. That is, it was true yesterday--a certain truth, if that expression is preferred--that the action was possible, but not that it was certain. 161 Watson's Institutes, Part II., Chapter IV., p. 216. 67
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THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD 1 or, THE
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PREFACE I am not entirely pleased w
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Bayle, "is to cause it, if he can,
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imply no contradiction. Hence it is
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3 Theodicy, p. 198. FAILURE OF DR.
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harmonies of sound. Moral agency, i
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constituted the reason why he, for
Page 15 and 16: heaven," as well as the angels; yet
Page 17 and 18: One point more from Dr. Bledsoe. He
Page 19 and 20: power not to perform. As a free act
Page 21 and 22: of the soul." But to return. A free
Page 23 and 24: 33 President Edwards. 34 35 consequ
Page 25 and 26: But experience may show a class of
Page 27 and 28: 41 Will, Part II., Chapter II., P.
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Page 33 and 34: 62 it suits best to gratify the vil
Page 35 and 36: is especially evident when, as is v
Page 37 and 38: 70 by the flavor, may be considered
Page 39 and 40: to gratify, the subjective motive.
Page 41 and 42: of choice. The former being a quali
Page 43 and 44: In the preceding paragraphs I have
Page 45 and 46: Mr. Webster also gives as one defin
Page 47 and 48: 97 Will, Part I., Section II., p. 5
Page 49 and 50: 105 Will, Part I, Section IV., p. 1
Page 51 and 52: But is this all? Is a mere thought
Page 53 and 54: in preference to both the sense of
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Page 57 and 58: happen otherwise. This is not the t
Page 59 and 60: 133 of such events he has and can h
Page 61 and 62: On page 9 of the Inquiry he says, "
Page 63 and 64: is indissoluble--that there cannot
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Page 73 and 74: It would not conflict with any noti
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Page 77 and 78: destroys all the force of the exhor
Page 79 and 80: for the Master's use. And we admit,
Page 81 and 82: 190 Institutes, Part II., Chapter V
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Page 99 and 100: To this we reply, 1. The destructio
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Deut. 32:21, compared with Rom. 9:1
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262 probability." In this sense of
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no matter how many times it has bee
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If depravity must be freely appropr
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probable facts of the future. The p
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his moral character changes, and as
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and denominator 41,410 figures. We
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Scriptures. but the signification o
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such as the Israelites committed be
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or foreknowing their free volitions
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Christ and his righteousness, and t
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(verse 34). The prophecy, then, was
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296 Epistle 2:18." He also says, "T
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when they are so manifestly spoken
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The Protestant world does not usual
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any free volition was made by him,
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it shall not prosper" verse 27. mi
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Isaiah 2;2-4. "And it shall come to
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Other evidence that he did not poss
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From the same notion of God's ignor
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