Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

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of such events he has and can have no prescience whatever." Here is a clear assumption that the proof
of a thing must be the cause of it. The theory Mr. Watson is combating, as stated in his own words, is that
the foreknowledge of contingent events is in its own nature impossible, or that the foreknowledge of an event
proves the non-existence of its contingency; but in attempting to show the great fallacy in the argument he
assumes that the certain prescience of a moral action destroys its contingency, or causes its non-existence.
The certain prescience of an action does not destroy its contingency, for, as has been proved (assuming
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with Mr. Watson that "contingency in moral actions is, therefore, their freedom" ), if an action is foreknown,
it has not and never did have any contingency to be destroyed.
"The foreknowledge of God," continues Mr. Watson, "has, then, no influence upon either the
freedom or the certainty of actions, for this plain reason, that it is knowledge and not influence; and actions
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may be certainly foreknown, without their being rendered necessary by that foreknowledge." Now all this
is freely admitted. Foreknowledge certainly has no influence on actions to render them necessary. But what
has this to do with the proposition that an agent cannot fail to do that which God foreknows he will do? The
same objection was urged by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Clark, to whom President Edwards replies, "The whole of
the seeming force of this evasion lies in this; that, inasmuch as certain Foreknowledge does not cause an
event to be necessary, as a decree does; therefore it does not prove it to be necessary, as a decree does.
But there is no force in this arguing: for it is built wholly on this supposition, that nothing can prove, or be an
evidence of a thing's being necessary, but that which has a causal influence to make it so." 136
The quiet assumption that foreknowledge cannot be the proof of a thing without being the cause of
it bears with just as great force against the doctrine of our opponents as against our own. For instance, Mr.
Watson says, "But here it is said, If the result of an absolute contingency be certainly foreknown, it can have
no other result, it cannot happen otherwise. This is not the true inference. It will not happen otherwise." 137
But, assuming that the proof of a thing must be the cause of it, how can Mr. Watson infer that it will not
happen otherwise? Is the foreknowledge the cause that it will not? His inference, indeed, is not to be
admitted; for the foreknowledge of God has no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions,
for this plain reason, that it is knowledge and not influence; and actions may be certainly foreknown without
being rendered certain by that foreknowledge. Says Dr. Bledsoe also: "It is freely conceded, that whatever
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God foreknows will most certainly and infallibly come to pass." But how can Dr. Bledsoe infer this? Indeed,
we may say in the words of his reply to Dr. Dick, "To dispel this grand illusion, it should be remembered that
the actions of men will not come to pass because they are foreknown." God's foreknowledge is not the
cause of their certainty just as it is not the cause of their being fixed.
Dr. Hayes attempts to prove what has usually been quietly assumed. He says: "Here, it seems to
me, is `a contradiction in terms;' knowledge has no causative power, `no influence' on the thing known; and
yet, if that knowledge exists--and because it exists--the agent cannot but do certain things. It has `no
influence,' and yet it destroys the power to do or not to do, which is the very essence of moral agency." 139
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Ibid., p. 213.
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Ibid, p. 215.
Institutes, p. 215.
Will, Part II., Section XII., p. 77.
Institutes, Part II., Chapter IV., p. 215.
Southern Review, July, 1874, p. 99.
Central Methodist, June 2, 1883.
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