Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

of choice. The former being a quality of an object, and the latter a quality of mind answering thereto, we may
speak of the choice of either without difference in meaning. We mean the same thing whether we speak of
choosing the sweetness of an apple or of choosing the appetite which is thereby gratified. We shall hereafter
speak of the act of choice only as affecting the subjective motive; in other words, we shall regard some
emotion of the mind as always the real object of choice.
But, it may be asked, even if we regard some emotion as always the real object of choice, is there
not some quality in it that serves as an inducement to the choice? It may be so, at least in some cases. But
if so, that quality, and that quality alone, is the real object of choice. For, if the emotion is chosen in view of
that quality (we do not say if it is chosen because of that quality, for we might thus be understood to assume
that the motive is the cause of the volition), any other emotion possessing the same quality would evidently
be chosen by the same act of choice. Moreover, if that quality should be found to be wanting, the emotion
would be refused without any change in the real act of choice. If some quality of a thing is necessary to a
choice of that thing, then, assuming with President Edwards and Dr. Whedon that the quality is chosen in
the choice of the object, some quality of that quality is necessary to the choice of the quality, and so on ad
infinitum.
It is more than probable that in many cases, when the choice of an emotion is made, the real choice
lies even back of this, viz., in some quality of the emotion. A common quality, which we may call pleasure
or agreeableness, seems to belong to most, if not all, of the selfish emotions, constituting in some cases a
motive to their choice; while the unselfish emotions seem to possess the common quality of worthiness.
When a selfish and an unselfish emotion, therefore, come together before the mind for choice, the
agreeableness of the one or the worthiness of the other may be the real thing chosen. In this way the choice
of one selfish or unselfish emotion may constitute the choice of others; the agreeableness or worthiness
being the real object of choice, every emotion possessing that quality is appropriated in the choice of the
quality. Perhaps this is the reason why one sin leads on to another, or why one supreme act of holiness has
a greater or less tendency to fix in the agent a holy character. Even in this case, however, we really choose
some more comprehensive emotion, viz., the pleasure arising from the gratification of the selfish emotion,
or the sense of worthiness gratified by that of the unselfish one. We still continue, therefore, to consider
some emotion more or less comprehensive as in every case the real object of choice.
Now, let it be understood that we do not deny that in every case there must be some inducement
to the action of will; that there must be something to excite the will to action. We only say that, if so, the
things to choose are themselves the inducements to the will's free action; that they alone arouse the real
act of choice. Just as a thing capable of satisfying an appetite when brought within the mind's view awakens
or excites that appetite, so it is not unreasonable to suppose that things capable of being chosen arouse the
mind to choice. And, in many cases at least, they certainly do so arouse the mind. There are many cases,
as Dr. Whedon well says, in which non-action of the will is impossible. If the question comes before us, for
instance, whether to do or not to do a certain thing, and we gratify one emotion or set of emotions by the
doing, another by the not doing, we must choose either one or the other. The presence of these emotions
in such a case not only arouses, but moves or compels the will to action. Even in the sense, therefore, in
which President Edwards uses the term motive, as a thing which absolutely moves the will, the presence
of things to choose is often, if not always, really and truly a motive. The will never acts without a motive, it
is said. True, in the two last senses of the term motive; but, in these senses, it is also true that the will never
acts freely without two motives, for it is evident that there cannot truly be a choice without at least two things
to choose between. Perhaps, however, it would be better to say that the two things to choose (if there are
only two) constitute but one motive to the will. The presence of both, as has been seen, moves the will to
choice, and the presence of both is necessary to its choosing. Certainly there could not truly be a choice,
if the opposite choice were impossible, and the opposite choice would be impossible if no other thing were
before the mind. As a thing that moves the will to choice, a motive, then, consists of at least two objects of
choice; but as each one of these objects seems to invite the will to choose it, we may still regard them as
two motives, and say, as at first, that the will never acts freely without two motives.
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