Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

It would not conflict with any notion of freedom to say that when an alternative is presented to the
mind a choice must be made, that is, that of several possible volitions one and no other must take place.
But would Dr. Whedon infer from this that each one volition, and the entire series of individual volitions,
though possible to be otherwise, yet must be each some particular one way? If so, and if his conclusion were
legitimate, he would establish the very doctrine that he has labored so diligently to overthrow--viz., the
necessity of human volitions. Indeed, by his argument, if legitimate, he has established that very doctrine;
for by the change from will to must the argument is not changed, and the given premise is equally true.
The argument of Dr. Whedon has been put as follows: "The question is this, Man, as a free, moral
agent, has power to do or not to do a certain thing; as a matter of fact, he will either do or not do it. Does,
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or can, God know which--whether he will do it or not." Here is the same confusion between the certainty
that some choice will be made, and the certainty of a particular choice. The premise means that as a matter
of fact he will make a choice between doing the thing and not doing it, from which is drawn the strange and
unwarranted conclusion that he will do the thing or that he will not do it. In the sense given we do not, of
course, deny that "he will either do or not do it," but we do not from such a premise infer either that he will
do it or that he will not do it. In other words, we are free to admit that one of the two--an undetermined oneeither
the doing or the not doing, will take place, but we do not thence infer that either particular one will take
place. On the other hand, if a man has a power to do or not to do a certain thing, it is not true either that he
will do it or that he will not do it. If he will do it, as we have seen, he has not the power not to do it; and if he
will not do it, he has not the power to do it.
A precisely similar argument was used by Hobbes and Locke to prove the necessity of all things.
"Let the case be put," says Mr. Hobbes, "of the weather: `tis necessary that to-morrow it shall rain or not
rain.' If, therefore, it be not necessary that it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain; otherwise there is no
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necessity that the proposition, it shall rain or not rain, should be true." And Mr. Locke says, "It is
unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man's power, which is once
proposed to a man's thoughts. The act of volition or preferring one of the two, being that, which he cannot
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avoid, a man in respect of that act of willing is under necessity." Now it is not difficult to expose the
transparent sophistry of these arguments. That the alternative of its raining or not raining is necessary does
not prove the necessity of either the one or the other. The necessity of preferring one of the two, either the
doing or the forbearance of an action, does not imply the necessity of either particular. The fact that a man
must either choose or refuse to do a certain thing does not infer the necessity either of the choice or the
refusal.
But is not the argument here made precisely the same as that given above? Is not the inference
here drawn in favor of the necessity of human volitions just as legitimate as that drawn in favor of their
certainty? To show how exactly similar are the two arguments, let us put them in the same form. "As a
matter of fact," it is said, "he will either do or not do it. Does or can God know which--whether he will do it
or not?" We may say with equal relevancy, As a matter of fact he must either do or not do it. Does God know
which--whether he must do it or not? The reply to the last would evidently be that if the action is free, it is
not true either that he must do it or that he must not do it; and, therefore, God does not know either. And we
can just as legitimately reply to the first that, if the action is free, it is not true either that he will do it or that
he will not do it; and, therefore, God does not know either.
In Part I., Chapter II., it was shown that the view herein set forth is the only view that does not set
limits to God's holiness in creating and governing the world. In the last chapter it was shown, also, that this
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Central Methodist, June 2, 1883.
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Southern Review, July, 1874, p. 106.
Southern Review, July, 1874, p. 106.
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