Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

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view does not set limits to the omnipotence of God. For, first, as Dr. Bledsoe has clearly shown, it is no limitation of God's power to say that he cannot work contradictions; and, secondly, to foreknow a free volition involves a contradiction. But, as Dr. Ralston has well remarked, there is a difference between the power to know and the knowledge itself. "The former constitutes no part of the attribute of omniscience, but is properly 180 embraced in the attribute of omnipotence." Therefore, although we do not limit the omnipotence of God in saying that he has no power to foreknow free volitions, do we not, it may be asked, limit his omniscience when we say that he does not foreknow them? In other words, is not the position that he does not foreknow free volitions utterly inconsistent with the fact that he knows all things, present, past, and future? We are prepared to answer this question in the negative. The foreknowledge of free volitions has throughout this discussion been used in its ordinary sense, that is, to mean a knowledge that they will come to pass, and in this sense foreknowledge of free volitions is not knowledge at all. A future free volition, it must be remembered, is an event that may and may not take place; it is not true of such an event either that it will or that it will not take place. To know, then, that such an event will come to pass is to know what is not true; in other words, it is not to know at all. It has been very judiciously said that all knowledge, whether human or divine, is really present knowledge, that is, it is knowledge of some present fact. When we say that God knows some past event, we mean that he knows that it did occur; when we say that he knows some future event, we mean that he knows that it will occur. "In either case the thing known is an existing fact--a present fact, not a past or future one. It matters not how long ago a thing was done; that it was done is a present fact, and must be, or it could 181 not be known--could not be a present knowledge. So of things yet in the future." These remarks are evidently just; they simply assert that, however unfathomable may be the depths of God's knowledge, he can and does know only what is now true. If, therefore, it is a fact that certain events will come to pass, God, who knows all things, certainly knows that fact; but if it is not such a fact, he certainly does not know that it is. It is perhaps unfortunate that the expression "foreknowledge of events," or "the knowledge of future events," should have obtained such a signification. As there are two classes of future events, those that will be and those that may be and may not be, this expression, if used at all, ought to have acquired two different meanings. When applied to necessary or certain occurrences, it properly means the knowledge that they will come to pass; but when applied to free volitions or contingent events, it ought to mean the knowledge that they may and may not come to pass. There would then have been no controversy about foreknowledge of contingencies. It would then have been admitted that God foreknows them as well as necessary events, even as it is now admitted that he knows that they may and may not come to pass, which is all that is true about them. But we say, If the expression is used at all. It would have been better, however, not to use it; for in the sense in which the term knowledge is used in this controversy, it is not within its province to know events or occurrences as things, but only to know concerning them that they have been or are or will be or must be or may be. "The knowledge of events," as the expression is now used, has different meanings, according as the events are past, present, or future. When applied to past events, it means a knowledge that they were; when to present, that they are; when to future, that they will be. The expression, therefore, might have been better discarded for its more accurate and expressive meanings. But to return. We can now see clearly that our view does not limit the omniscience of God. We say that God does not foreknow contingent events; but all that we mean by this is that he does not know that they will be. There are two kinds of future events; those that are certainly future and those that are possibly future; those that will be and those that may be. In saying, then, that God does not foreknow contingencies, we merely assert concerning the possibly future events, or the events that may be, that God does not know 180 Elements of Divinity, Part I., Chapter II., p. 23. 181 Dr. G. H. Hayes, in Central Methodist, June 9, 1883. 74
that they are certainly future, or that they will be. Do we, then, set limits to God's omniscience? Certainly not. If we should say concerning past events that God does not know that they are future, or concerning future events that God does not know that they are past, we should not set limits to the omniscience of God; we should merely assert that he does not know that to be true which is untrue. So when we say concerning the possibly future events that God does not know that they are certainly future, we do not set limits to God's omniscience; we merely maintain that his knowledge of certainties does not wander at large over the whole range of possibilities, but of its very nature is confined within the sacred bounds of light and truth. We say that God does not foreknow contingencies in the sense of knowing that they will come to pass; our opponents say that he does. What is a contingency? Mr. Webster defines contingent: "Possible, or liable, but not certain to occur." And the preceding investigation shows us that there are just such contingent events--events that are not certain, but that may and may not occur. To illustrate: Adam's fall was, before he was created, a contingency; for it was then dependent on Adam's choice, and might and might not occur. My eternal salvation, previous to my choice to serve God, is a contingency; for it is an event that may and may not occur. Now, the position of our opponents is that God foreknows all contingencies; that he knew, for instance, before Adam was created that he would fall. If so, he knows that I will be eternally saved, for my eternal salvation is a contingency. But my eternal loss is also a contingency; therefore he also foreknows that I will be eternally lost. Moreover, Adam might have refused to eat the forbidden fruit. His refusal to eat was therefore as much a contingency as his fall. If God foreknows all contingencies, then, he knew that Adam would refuse to eat the forbidden fruit, and would forever maintain his original innocence and purity. Into such inconsistencies does the doctrine of the Divine prescience of contingencies lead. But some one may say, Suppose I commit a sin to-day; did God know before I was born that I would do so? No, we answer; for it was not then true that the sin would be committed; it was only true that it might be committed and might not. Did God know before Adam was created that he would fall? No, for it was not then true that he would fall; it was only true that he might fall and might not fall. Did God foreknow from all eternity all the good and evil actions of men, dependent on their free volitions; that is, did he know that they would come to pass? No, for it was not true from all eternity that they would come to pass. On the other hand, it was true that they might not come to pass, "according to the self-determining power of the agent." God certainly did not know what was contradictory of the truth. Does God know whether I will be saved or lost? No, for these are not will-be things. I may be saved and I may be lost, according to my choice to serve God or to serve mammon. These are the proper answers to all such questions; and in answering thus we do not set limits to God's omniscience; we only declare that God's foreknowledge is knowledge, and not some absurd and miserable caricature of knowledge. It is true that God knows all things, present, past, and future; but he knows them as they are, and not otherwise; that is, he knows the present as present, the past as past, the certainly future as certainly future, and the possibly future as possibly future. CHAPTER VIII: POSITIVE SCRIPTURE ARGUMENT The argument from the Scriptures is one on which our opponents rely with great confidence. It constitutes, indeed, the real basis of their belief. It must be true, say they, that God foreknows contingent events, for the word of God so teaches. Doubtless this furnishes the reason why the simple proposition that a finite agent cannot do otherwise than God foreknows he will do, has not been universally accepted. There cannot be any incompatibility between God's foreknowledge and man's free agency, say some, because the Scriptures foretell men's free actions. Before proceeding to examine this Scripture argument, however, let us have recourse to the same source for proof to the contrary. Our opponents seem to think that the teachings of the word of God lie altogether on their side. We hope to show that at least a preponderance of testimony from this source is against them. 75
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THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD 1 or, THE
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PREFACE I am not entirely pleased w
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Bayle, "is to cause it, if he can,
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imply no contradiction. Hence it is
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3 Theodicy, p. 198. FAILURE OF DR.
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harmonies of sound. Moral agency, i
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constituted the reason why he, for
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heaven," as well as the angels; yet
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One point more from Dr. Bledsoe. He
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power not to perform. As a free act
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of the soul." But to return. A free
Page 23 and 24: 33 President Edwards. 34 35 consequ
Page 25 and 26: But experience may show a class of
Page 27 and 28: 41 Will, Part II., Chapter II., P.
Page 29 and 30: "SECONDLY. If a power of Will deter
Page 31 and 32: "MOTIVE is usually considered as a
Page 33 and 34: 62 it suits best to gratify the vil
Page 35 and 36: is especially evident when, as is v
Page 37 and 38: 70 by the flavor, may be considered
Page 39 and 40: to gratify, the subjective motive.
Page 41 and 42: of choice. The former being a quali
Page 43 and 44: In the preceding paragraphs I have
Page 45 and 46: Mr. Webster also gives as one defin
Page 47 and 48: 97 Will, Part I., Section II., p. 5
Page 49 and 50: 105 Will, Part I, Section IV., p. 1
Page 51 and 52: But is this all? Is a mere thought
Page 53 and 54: in preference to both the sense of
Page 55 and 56: contend for in the case of man is t
Page 57 and 58: happen otherwise. This is not the t
Page 59 and 60: 133 of such events he has and can h
Page 61 and 62: On page 9 of the Inquiry he says, "
Page 63 and 64: is indissoluble--that there cannot
Page 65 and 66: is evident from the fact that, the
Page 67 and 68: CHAPTER VII: OMNISCIENCE DOES NOT F
Page 69 and 70: It is easy to prove that whatever w
Page 71 and 72: its agent cannot refuse to act it.
Page 73: It would not conflict with any noti
Page 77 and 78: destroys all the force of the exhor
Page 79 and 80: for the Master's use. And we admit,
Page 81 and 82: 190 Institutes, Part II., Chapter V
Page 83 and 84: the Scripture says of God's immutab
Page 85 and 86: eginning of the condition of things
Page 87 and 88: are sojourners of the Dispersion in
Page 89 and 90: emotion, and constitute the princip
Page 91 and 92: In the first place, this doctrine i
Page 93 and 94: either prove God's necessitation of
Page 95 and 96: the choice, every possible result o
Page 97 and 98: 218 Will, Part II., Section XI., p.
Page 99 and 100: To this we reply, 1. The destructio
Page 101 and 102: PREDICTIONS FOLLOWING THE FREE VOLI
Page 103 and 104: he caused, permitted, or predicted,
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Page 107 and 108: passions to bear fruit to David's p
Page 109 and 110: spoken of Judas. 1. Psalm 41:9. "Mi
Page 111 and 112: temporal, but as a spiritual power.
Page 113 and 114: nothing is said about any one's bei
Page 115 and 116: determined before to be done." 252
Page 117 and 118: Deut. 32:21, compared with Rom. 9:1
Page 119 and 120: 262 probability." In this sense of
Page 121 and 122: no matter how many times it has bee
Page 123 and 124: If depravity must be freely appropr
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probable facts of the future. The p
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his moral character changes, and as
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and denominator 41,410 figures. We
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Scriptures. but the signification o
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such as the Israelites committed be
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or foreknowing their free volitions
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Christ and his righteousness, and t
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(verse 34). The prophecy, then, was
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296 Epistle 2:18." He also says, "T
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when they are so manifestly spoken
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The Protestant world does not usual
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any free volition was made by him,
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it shall not prosper" verse 27. mi
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Isaiah 2;2-4. "And it shall come to
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Other evidence that he did not poss
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From the same notion of God's ignor
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