Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

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But "mere certainty of event does not in any measure imply necessity." Well, suppose that it does not. Does that warrant us in assuming the anterior certainty of all events in proof of the proposition that free actions may be foreknown? The truth of this assertion, however, is a matter of question. Does anterior certainty imply necessity? By Arminian writers this question is almost uniformly answered in the negative. The answer of Dr. Clarke, approved by Mr. Watson, is seen above. This, also, is the ground taken by Bledsoe, Whedon, Ralston, and others, who all contend that God's foreknowledge of events proves their certainty, but not their necessity. Necessitarians, on the other hand, contend that necessity is the only possible ground of certainty, and that, therefore, whatever is certain is also necessary. This point we now proceed to investigate. We have seen that the word necessity is used in two different senses. A thing is necessary, according to President Edwards, when it cannot be otherwise. In this sense all past events are necessary. Having already made sure of existence, as President Edwards says, they cannot now be otherwise. In the sense in which it is used by most of his opponents, a thing is necessary when it is produced by a necessitating cause. As the question now under investigation, however, has reference only to anterior necessity, it is immaterial in which sense the term is used; for, if before it occurs an event cannot be otherwise, its cause is evidently a necessitating one. The word certain also has different meanings. Mr. Watson says, "Certainty is, properly speaking, no quality of an action at all, unless it be taken in the sense of a fixed and necessitated action: in this controversy it means the certainty which the mind that foresees has that an action will be done, and the 162 certainty is therefore in the mind, and not in the action." Derived as it is from the Latin cernere, "to perceive," this is doubtless its original sense. In this sense the word certain means "assured in mind, having 163 no doubts," and when it is spoken with reference to the Deity, there is no difference in this sense between anterior certainty and foreknowledge. But this is not the sense in which this term is used in this controversy. Dr. Clarke contended, as we have seen, that all actions are certain, whether foreseen or not, and surely he did not mean that God could be certain of them or have no doubts of their future existence without foreknowing them. Mr. Watson himself, too, on page 215, was contending that foreknowledge of events proves their certainty, but not their necessity, and it seems strange if he meant by this to say that their foreknowledge proves their foreknowledge. Moreover, on the same page, he very clearly defines the sense in which he uses the term. "The question is not," says he, "in point of fact, about the certainty of moral actions, that is, whether they will happen or not; but about the nature of them, whether free or constrained, whether they must happen or not." Dr. Whedon says, "Of the former, the entirety, all the elements are pervaded by the will-be, and yet the canbe-otherwise; the other by the must-be and the can-be-no-otherwise. The former is pure certainty; the latter 164 is necessity." According to these authors, then, the certainty of an event consists in the fact that it will be; and this is the sense in which it is used by all writers on this subject who admit or contend that the foreknowledge of events proves their certainty. The proposition, then, maintained by necessitarians that anterior certainty implies necessity--a proposition which the force of truth compels us to indorse--resolves itself into this: that whatever will be must be. It has been said that this cannot be true, unless will and must, or certainty and necessity, are identical in meaning. But this does not follow. Observation may convince me that every horned animal ruminates, and, conversely, that every ruminant animal has horns; but we could not infer from this that ruminant and horned are identical in meaning. 162 Watson's Institutes, Part II., Chapter IV., foot-note, p. 215. 163 164 Webster's Dictionary. Will, p. 275. 68
It is easy to prove that whatever will be must be; for if a thing will be no power in heaven or earth can cause it not to be at the same time; this would be to work a contradiction. And if no power can cause a thing not to be, that is, if no power can prevent it from being, it must be. Dr. Bledsoe admits that, if a thing "will exist, it will be impossible for it not to exist at the time of its 165 existence," and says, "Foreknowledge, I admit, infers this kind of necessity." He calls this an axiomatical necessity, and says, "It arises from the impossibility of a thing's not existing at the time that it does exist; and it has no reference whatever to the causation of any thing: it is a fundamental law of belief, and not a causal 166 necessity." He says, moreover, that this is not a kind of necessity "against which any libertarian is at all 167 concerned to contend." It seems to me that many libertarians have contended against the proposition that a future free action cannot but exist; in other words, that its agent cannot refuse to act it. We agree with Dr. Bledsoe that this is an axiomatical necessity. It arises from the axiom, or fundamental law of belief, that it is impossible for a thing to exist and not to exist at one and the same time. Of course this axiom has no reference whatever to the causation of any thing; it does not even assert that any thing has a cause. But it was not necessary that this assertion should be made. We know by another fundamental law of belief that every thing that begins to exist has a cause; and then this axiom steps in and proves to us that if a thing will exist, it is impossible for the cause of its existence not to produce it; in other words, that that cause is a necessitating cause. And surely this is a kind of necessity against which all libertarians have been concerned to contend. Dr. Whedon seems to deny the proposition that if a thing will exist, it is impossible for it not to exist at the same time. "The two facts," says he, "namely, that he will act thus, and that there resides in him the power of other action, may be seen at the same time by God and be mutually consistent with each other." 168 It seems a little strange that Dr. Whedon could not see that if an agent will act thus, the power of other action constitutes a power to act thus and not to act thus, at one and the same time. He says, however, "Of course in all such propositions as this we mean otherwise instead, or substitutively; and not two opposite ways at 169 the same time." By this we suppose that he means that a man has a power to act in a certain way, and also a power, if he should not act thus, to act differently; and we freely grant that man has just such an alternative or double power. But if he will certainly act in a certain way, the condition, if he should not act thus, is excluded, and then the power of other action constitutes a power to act in two opposite ways at the same time. Dr. Hayes admits the proposition that it is beyond the province of power to cause a thing that will exist not to exist at the time that it exists, but denies that it is beyond the province of power to cause a thing 170 that will exist not to exist, "leaving off the last clause of the second, namely, `at the time that it exists.'" It is strange that he could not perceive that if "the time that it exists" is or will be a time at all, the truth of the latter proposition necessarily results from that of the former. For, to cause a thing not to exist at the time that it exists is to exclude it from existence at that time; to cause a thing not to exist is to exclude it entirely from existence: and surely it ought not to be difficult to perceive that, if it is beyond the province of power to 165 Southern Review, July, 1874, p. 97. 166 167 168 169 170 Southern Review, July, 1874, p. 97. Ibid., pp. 92,93. Will, p. 272. Ibid., p. 273, foot-note. Central Methodist, September 18, 1887. 69
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THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD 1 or, THE
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PREFACE I am not entirely pleased w
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Bayle, "is to cause it, if he can,
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imply no contradiction. Hence it is
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3 Theodicy, p. 198. FAILURE OF DR.
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harmonies of sound. Moral agency, i
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constituted the reason why he, for
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heaven," as well as the angels; yet
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Page 19 and 20: power not to perform. As a free act
Page 21 and 22: of the soul." But to return. A free
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Page 41 and 42: of choice. The former being a quali
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Page 45 and 46: Mr. Webster also gives as one defin
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Page 59 and 60: 133 of such events he has and can h
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262 probability." In this sense of
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no matter how many times it has bee
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If depravity must be freely appropr
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probable facts of the future. The p
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his moral character changes, and as
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and denominator 41,410 figures. We
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Scriptures. but the signification o
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such as the Israelites committed be
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or foreknowing their free volitions
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Christ and his righteousness, and t
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(verse 34). The prophecy, then, was
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296 Epistle 2:18." He also says, "T
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when they are so manifestly spoken
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The Protestant world does not usual
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any free volition was made by him,
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it shall not prosper" verse 27. mi
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Isaiah 2;2-4. "And it shall come to
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Other evidence that he did not poss
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From the same notion of God's ignor
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