Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

But is this all? Is a mere thought of change sufficient? Is not some awakening also necessary? Must
not some impression be made upon the sensibilities as well as upon the intellect? Suppose that it is
suggested to a man that he should change his course of conduct. Though he may admit that he ought to
make the change suggested, is it not necessary that some impression should be made upon the sensitive
part of his nature to induce the change? In other words, will he make the change without an inducement?
It seems not. At any rate, we do not usually proceed on this supposition. If we wish a man to repent of his
misdeeds and change his course, we are not satisfied simply to suggest repentance; we endeavor to bring
some influence to bear upon him to induce it. Or if a bare suggestion seems in some cases to be sufficient,
do we not naturally infer that it does so because it carries some inducement along with it?
But what is an inducement? It is evidently nothing more nor less than a motive; and this, again, is
but another emotion, either as a thing to choose or a thing already chosen. But this drives us to the
conclusion that a choice is seldom, if ever, directly reversed. For a choice is always relative; that is, we
always choose one emotion rather than another. If, then, another emotion is awakened different from the
ones between which the original choice was made, and a change of conduct is made on that account, the
original relative choice is not reviewed. The choice now (either already made or to be made) is between the
new emotion and that originally chosen, and the comparative choice of this new emotion is the cause of the
change of conduct. To illustrate: Two courses of conduct are presented to the judgment in which some
selfish emotion is arrayed against the sense of duty. Suppose that the selfish emotion is chosen and
gratified. Then, of course, the sense of duty is left ungratified. But it is the nature of any emotion when left
ungratified to produce a sense of uneasiness. An uneasiness--remorse of conscience--is therefore felt, and
the man resolves that the sinful action shall not be repeated. Now, is the original choice reversed? Not
exactly. In the first place, the selfish emotion was chosen rather than the sense of duty. In the second place,
the sense of duty and the love of ease were chosen rather than the selfish emotion.
But it may be objected that, if this is true, there can be no such thing as real repentance. Without
an absolute reversal of choice a wicked man cannot really turn from his wickedness and do that which is
lawful and right. For the very essence of right-doing consists in choosing the love of God rather that all other
emotions combined that can array themselves against it. "If any man come to me, and hate not his father,
and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my
disciple." (Luke 14:26.) If, therefore, a man has chosen to gratify some emotion rather than the love of God,
and there must be some other emotion arrayed on the side of the love of God to induce a change, the love
of God cannot be chosen in preference to all other emotions.
It must be remembered, however, that I merely said that a choice cannot be directly reversed. I did
not say that it could not be indirectly done. In the preceding case, for instance, after the sense of duty and
the love of ease have been chosen rather than the selfish emotion, the love of ease may fade out of view,
leaving the original choice reversed. Or the very fact that the selfish emotion is now refused may serve to
place the original emotions before the mind again as things to choose between, thus affording an opportunity
for reversal. This latter seems in the light of consciousness to be the true doctrine. For, although, by the
second act of choice, the love of ease is evidently chosen in conjunction with the sense of duty, the mind
thinks of the sense of duty mainly as the actuating principle. The love of ease is regarded merely as an
inducement to the change. Therefore, when the selfish propensity and the sense of duty are again present
in the mind, a sense of uneasiness being attached as much to one as to the other, so that the love of ease
is not a thing to choose on either side, the original emotions are again thought of as matters of choice, and
sometimes the one and sometimes the other is chosen. I say that the choice of the sense of duty and the
love of ease merely furnishes an opportunity for reversal. It is not the reversal itself, nor does it always result
in a change of conduct. For we know that after having, under remorse of conscience, resolved to amend our
course that resolution is frequently broken when the temptation comes again. This seems to be the
philosophy of reversal of choice. We must not forget, however, the grace of God, the forgiveness of sins,
the gift of the Holy Ghost, by which all our iniquities may be blotted out--by which all the principles fixed in
the soul by its own choice may be erased, and opportunity given for change of character.
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