Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

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there is no sort of similarity between the question, "Can man enlighten God with reference to a certain thing, and cause him at the same time to be ignorant of it?" and the conclusion of the argument, If God foreknows that an event will happen, it is beyond man's power to cause it to fail to happen; or, If God foreknows an action, its agent cannot refuse to act it. Is not Dr. Hayes's reply to this argument, then, merely a misstatement (unintentional, of course) of the conclusion? And is not such a misstatement all that can be done in reply to the argument? So it seems to me. The conclusion properly stated cannot, it seems to me, be successfully resisted but by denying the premises, and these are too clearly self-evident to be denied. We have now but a single step to the establishment of our second position; viz., that to foreknow a free volition, or a free action of the soul, is a contradiction. We take for our premise the conclusion of the last syllogism, viz., that, if God foreknows an action, its agent cannot refuse to act it, and, remembering that it is the nature of a free action that before it is acted its agent can refuse to act it, we arrive at the conclusion that, if God foreknows a free action, it has not the nature of a free action; it is a free action and it is not a free action at one and the same time. God, then, cannot foreknow a free action, for if an action is foreknown, it is not free. A foreknown free action is as much a contradiction as a necessary free action. Necessitarians have with great unanimity asserted that the foreknowledge of an event proves that event to be necessary. They have always contended that if God foreknows an event, that event cannot but happen. To this Arminians have replied that foreknowledge has no influence on the thing known to cause it to come to pass. But what has this latter proposition to do with the former? We say (for, as has been seen, we agree with the necessitarians on this point) that the foreknowledge of an event proves that it cannot but happen. Our opponents reply that the foreknowledge of an event does not cause it to happen. Now is this latter proposition in any respect a reply to the former? Are the two propositions in the least degree contradictory? I do not see how they can be thought to be so. It certainly will not be contended that the proof of a thing is necessarily the cause of it. Concurrent testimony is a proof that much wickedness exists on earth, but it would be thought strange if any one should infer from this that the testimony is the cause of the wickedness. Why, then, is the latter proposition used as a disproof of the former? Dr. Bledsoe says, "On this point the testimony of Dr. Dick himself is explicit: `Whatever is the foundation of his foreknowledge,' says he, `what he does foreknow will undoubtedly take place. Hence, then, the actions of men are as unalterably fixed from eternity, as if they had been the subject of an immutable 130 decree.' But to dispel this grand illusion, it should be remembered, that the actions of men will not come to pass because they are foreknown; but they are foreknown because they will come to pass. The free actions of men are clearly reflected back in the mirror of the divine omniscience--they are not projected 131 forward from the engine of the divine omnipotence." Here Dr. Dick says that the fact "that what he does foreknow will undoubtedly take place" proves that the actions of men are unalterably fixed. The word hence indicates that he considers the one merely as proof of the other. Dr. Bledsoe, in reply, says that the actions of men are not caused by their being foreknown. But what has Dr. Bledsoe's proposition to do with Dr. Dick's conclusion? How does the one "dispel the grand illusion" of the other? So far are these propositions from being contradictory, indeed, that we may with the most perfect consistency believe them both. Mr. Watson says: "The great fallacy in the argument, that the certain prescience of a moral action destroys its contingent nature, lies in supposing that contingency and certainty are the opposites of each 132 other." This is said in reply to the theory "that the foreknowledge of contingent events, being in its own nature impossible, because it implies a contradiction, it does no dishonor to the Divine Being to affirm, that 130 "Theology, vol. i, p. 358." 131 132 Theodicy, p. 228. Institutes, Part II., Chapter IV., p. 215. 58
133 of such events he has and can have no prescience whatever." Here is a clear assumption that the proof of a thing must be the cause of it. The theory Mr. Watson is combating, as stated in his own words, is that the foreknowledge of contingent events is in its own nature impossible, or that the foreknowledge of an event proves the non-existence of its contingency; but in attempting to show the great fallacy in the argument he assumes that the certain prescience of a moral action destroys its contingency, or causes its non-existence. The certain prescience of an action does not destroy its contingency, for, as has been proved (assuming 134 with Mr. Watson that "contingency in moral actions is, therefore, their freedom" ), if an action is foreknown, it has not and never did have any contingency to be destroyed. "The foreknowledge of God," continues Mr. Watson, "has, then, no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for this plain reason, that it is knowledge and not influence; and actions 135 may be certainly foreknown, without their being rendered necessary by that foreknowledge." Now all this is freely admitted. Foreknowledge certainly has no influence on actions to render them necessary. But what has this to do with the proposition that an agent cannot fail to do that which God foreknows he will do? The same objection was urged by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Clark, to whom President Edwards replies, "The whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in this; that, inasmuch as certain Foreknowledge does not cause an event to be necessary, as a decree does; therefore it does not prove it to be necessary, as a decree does. But there is no force in this arguing: for it is built wholly on this supposition, that nothing can prove, or be an evidence of a thing's being necessary, but that which has a causal influence to make it so." 136 The quiet assumption that foreknowledge cannot be the proof of a thing without being the cause of it bears with just as great force against the doctrine of our opponents as against our own. For instance, Mr. Watson says, "But here it is said, If the result of an absolute contingency be certainly foreknown, it can have no other result, it cannot happen otherwise. This is not the true inference. It will not happen otherwise." 137 But, assuming that the proof of a thing must be the cause of it, how can Mr. Watson infer that it will not happen otherwise? Is the foreknowledge the cause that it will not? His inference, indeed, is not to be admitted; for the foreknowledge of God has no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for this plain reason, that it is knowledge and not influence; and actions may be certainly foreknown without being rendered certain by that foreknowledge. Says Dr. Bledsoe also: "It is freely conceded, that whatever 138 God foreknows will most certainly and infallibly come to pass." But how can Dr. Bledsoe infer this? Indeed, we may say in the words of his reply to Dr. Dick, "To dispel this grand illusion, it should be remembered that the actions of men will not come to pass because they are foreknown." God's foreknowledge is not the cause of their certainty just as it is not the cause of their being fixed. Dr. Hayes attempts to prove what has usually been quietly assumed. He says: "Here, it seems to me, is `a contradiction in terms;' knowledge has no causative power, `no influence' on the thing known; and yet, if that knowledge exists--and because it exists--the agent cannot but do certain things. It has `no influence,' and yet it destroys the power to do or not to do, which is the very essence of moral agency." 139 133 Ibid., p. 213. 134 135 136 137 138 139 Ibid, p. 215. Institutes, p. 215. Will, Part II., Section XII., p. 77. Institutes, Part II., Chapter IV., p. 215. Southern Review, July, 1874, p. 99. Central Methodist, June 2, 1883. 59
Page 1 and 2:
THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD 1 or, THE
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PREFACE I am not entirely pleased w
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Bayle, "is to cause it, if he can,
Page 7 and 8: imply no contradiction. Hence it is
Page 9 and 10: 3 Theodicy, p. 198. FAILURE OF DR.
Page 11 and 12: harmonies of sound. Moral agency, i
Page 13 and 14: constituted the reason why he, for
Page 15 and 16: heaven," as well as the angels; yet
Page 17 and 18: One point more from Dr. Bledsoe. He
Page 19 and 20: power not to perform. As a free act
Page 21 and 22: of the soul." But to return. A free
Page 23 and 24: 33 President Edwards. 34 35 consequ
Page 25 and 26: But experience may show a class of
Page 27 and 28: 41 Will, Part II., Chapter II., P.
Page 29 and 30: "SECONDLY. If a power of Will deter
Page 31 and 32: "MOTIVE is usually considered as a
Page 33 and 34: 62 it suits best to gratify the vil
Page 35 and 36: is especially evident when, as is v
Page 37 and 38: 70 by the flavor, may be considered
Page 39 and 40: to gratify, the subjective motive.
Page 41 and 42: of choice. The former being a quali
Page 43 and 44: In the preceding paragraphs I have
Page 45 and 46: Mr. Webster also gives as one defin
Page 47 and 48: 97 Will, Part I., Section II., p. 5
Page 49 and 50: 105 Will, Part I, Section IV., p. 1
Page 51 and 52: But is this all? Is a mere thought
Page 53 and 54: in preference to both the sense of
Page 55 and 56: contend for in the case of man is t
Page 57: happen otherwise. This is not the t
Page 61 and 62: On page 9 of the Inquiry he says, "
Page 63 and 64: is indissoluble--that there cannot
Page 65 and 66: is evident from the fact that, the
Page 67 and 68: CHAPTER VII: OMNISCIENCE DOES NOT F
Page 69 and 70: It is easy to prove that whatever w
Page 71 and 72: its agent cannot refuse to act it.
Page 73 and 74: It would not conflict with any noti
Page 75 and 76: that they are certainly future, or
Page 77 and 78: destroys all the force of the exhor
Page 79 and 80: for the Master's use. And we admit,
Page 81 and 82: 190 Institutes, Part II., Chapter V
Page 83 and 84: the Scripture says of God's immutab
Page 85 and 86: eginning of the condition of things
Page 87 and 88: are sojourners of the Dispersion in
Page 89 and 90: emotion, and constitute the princip
Page 91 and 92: In the first place, this doctrine i
Page 93 and 94: either prove God's necessitation of
Page 95 and 96: the choice, every possible result o
Page 97 and 98: 218 Will, Part II., Section XI., p.
Page 99 and 100: To this we reply, 1. The destructio
Page 101 and 102: PREDICTIONS FOLLOWING THE FREE VOLI
Page 103 and 104: he caused, permitted, or predicted,
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Page 107 and 108: passions to bear fruit to David's p
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spoken of Judas. 1. Psalm 41:9. "Mi
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temporal, but as a spiritual power.
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nothing is said about any one's bei
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determined before to be done." 252
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Deut. 32:21, compared with Rom. 9:1
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262 probability." In this sense of
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no matter how many times it has bee
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If depravity must be freely appropr
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probable facts of the future. The p
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his moral character changes, and as
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and denominator 41,410 figures. We
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Scriptures. but the signification o
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such as the Israelites committed be
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or foreknowing their free volitions
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Christ and his righteousness, and t
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(verse 34). The prophecy, then, was
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296 Epistle 2:18." He also says, "T
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when they are so manifestly spoken
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The Protestant world does not usual
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any free volition was made by him,
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it shall not prosper" verse 27. mi
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Isaiah 2;2-4. "And it shall come to
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Other evidence that he did not poss
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From the same notion of God's ignor
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