Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

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it can produce only one of its possible effects. The coming into existence of one, therefore, is the not coming into existence of any other. This, then, is the result: If one will come into existence, another will come into existence; but the coming into existence of that other is the not coming into existence of the one; therefore, if it is true that it will come into existence, it is also true that it will not come into existence. This argument will, of course, not be affected by the substitution of any other term instead of will. Hence, if it is true that a free action must come into existence, it is also true that it must not come into existence; if it is true that it may come into existence, it is also true that it may not come into existence; if it is true that it is certain to exist, it is also true that it is certain not to exist; if its existence is possible, its nonexistence is also possible. It is evident, therefore, that may or possible is the only term that can be consistently used to express the relation of a free action to coming into existence. It is commonly said that a contingency is an event that may or may not come to pass. Regarding free volitions and events dependent thereon as the only true contingencies, it would be more properly said that a contingency is an event that may and may not come to pass; for if it is true that such an event may come to pass, it is also true that it may not come to pass. Dr. Whedon says, "Whether there be any foreknowledge or not, it is certain that there will be a one 174 particular course of future events and no other." We have only one objection to make to this assertion, and that is that there is not "a one" single particle of truth in it. On the other hand, if the future events are free volitions, it is certain of each one that it may not be or may be otherwise, "according," as Mr. Watson says, "to the self-determining power of the agent." But says Dr. Whedon, "If it be true that an agent THIS MOMENT puts forth an act in the full possession of a power for contrary act instead, then the doctrine of freedom is just and true. But the proposition that such an act will be put forth--namely, an act put forth with full power for contrary--though unknown to any human mind, was true A MOMENT BEFORE the alternatives arose." 175 This is just exactly what was not true a moment before. The fact that it is true now that the act is being put forth does not prove that it was true a moment before that it would be put forth. True, the act was then a future event in the widest and most ordinary sense of the term future, but we cannot on this account infer that it was a will-be event. A future event is an event that is liable to be as well as an event that will be, and the very fact that the act spoken of was free leads to the inference that it belonged to the former rather than to the latter class of future events. It was not a will-be, but a may-be event; it was not certainly future, it was only possibly future. But Dr. Whedon says, "Freedom, in every individual case, as we have defined it, implies, that of several possible volitions, one and no other will take place: one in opposition to many--numerically; one in opposition to any other instead--alternatively. And so of a whole series of volitions, namely, of the entire existence of any one free being, temporal or even eternal, each one volition, and the entire series of his 176 individual volitions, though possible to be otherwise, yet will be each some particular one way." We have no objection to Dr. Whedon's definition of freedom, nor to the assertion that "of several possible volitions one and no other will take place;" but this is far different from saying that "each one volition will be each some particular one way." The conclusion does not follow from, nor is it contained in, the premise. There is certainly a great difference between saying that only one--an undetermined one--of several possible volitions will be put forth, and saying that a particular one will be put forth. The first is simply equivalent to saying that a choice will be made, and implies that any one of the several possible volitions may be put forth. The second affirms the certainty of one volition, and, by a common-sense inference, implies that no other is possible. 174 Will, p. 274. 175 176 Ibid., p. 280. Will, p. 274. 72
It would not conflict with any notion of freedom to say that when an alternative is presented to the mind a choice must be made, that is, that of several possible volitions one and no other must take place. But would Dr. Whedon infer from this that each one volition, and the entire series of individual volitions, though possible to be otherwise, yet must be each some particular one way? If so, and if his conclusion were legitimate, he would establish the very doctrine that he has labored so diligently to overthrow--viz., the necessity of human volitions. Indeed, by his argument, if legitimate, he has established that very doctrine; for by the change from will to must the argument is not changed, and the given premise is equally true. The argument of Dr. Whedon has been put as follows: "The question is this, Man, as a free, moral agent, has power to do or not to do a certain thing; as a matter of fact, he will either do or not do it. Does, 177 or can, God know which--whether he will do it or not." Here is the same confusion between the certainty that some choice will be made, and the certainty of a particular choice. The premise means that as a matter of fact he will make a choice between doing the thing and not doing it, from which is drawn the strange and unwarranted conclusion that he will do the thing or that he will not do it. In the sense given we do not, of course, deny that "he will either do or not do it," but we do not from such a premise infer either that he will do it or that he will not do it. In other words, we are free to admit that one of the two--an undetermined oneeither the doing or the not doing, will take place, but we do not thence infer that either particular one will take place. On the other hand, if a man has a power to do or not to do a certain thing, it is not true either that he will do it or that he will not do it. If he will do it, as we have seen, he has not the power not to do it; and if he will not do it, he has not the power to do it. A precisely similar argument was used by Hobbes and Locke to prove the necessity of all things. "Let the case be put," says Mr. Hobbes, "of the weather: `tis necessary that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain.' If, therefore, it be not necessary that it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain; otherwise there is no 178 necessity that the proposition, it shall rain or not rain, should be true." And Mr. Locke says, "It is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man's power, which is once proposed to a man's thoughts. The act of volition or preferring one of the two, being that, which he cannot 179 avoid, a man in respect of that act of willing is under necessity." Now it is not difficult to expose the transparent sophistry of these arguments. That the alternative of its raining or not raining is necessary does not prove the necessity of either the one or the other. The necessity of preferring one of the two, either the doing or the forbearance of an action, does not imply the necessity of either particular. The fact that a man must either choose or refuse to do a certain thing does not infer the necessity either of the choice or the refusal. But is not the argument here made precisely the same as that given above? Is not the inference here drawn in favor of the necessity of human volitions just as legitimate as that drawn in favor of their certainty? To show how exactly similar are the two arguments, let us put them in the same form. "As a matter of fact," it is said, "he will either do or not do it. Does or can God know which--whether he will do it or not?" We may say with equal relevancy, As a matter of fact he must either do or not do it. Does God know which--whether he must do it or not? The reply to the last would evidently be that if the action is free, it is not true either that he must do it or that he must not do it; and, therefore, God does not know either. And we can just as legitimately reply to the first that, if the action is free, it is not true either that he will do it or that he will not do it; and, therefore, God does not know either. In Part I., Chapter II., it was shown that the view herein set forth is the only view that does not set limits to God's holiness in creating and governing the world. In the last chapter it was shown, also, that this 177 Central Methodist, June 2, 1883. 178 179 Southern Review, July, 1874, p. 106. Southern Review, July, 1874, p. 106. 73
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THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD 1 or, THE
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PREFACE I am not entirely pleased w
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Bayle, "is to cause it, if he can,
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imply no contradiction. Hence it is
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3 Theodicy, p. 198. FAILURE OF DR.
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harmonies of sound. Moral agency, i
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constituted the reason why he, for
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heaven," as well as the angels; yet
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One point more from Dr. Bledsoe. He
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power not to perform. As a free act
Page 21 and 22: of the soul." But to return. A free
Page 23 and 24: 33 President Edwards. 34 35 consequ
Page 25 and 26: But experience may show a class of
Page 27 and 28: 41 Will, Part II., Chapter II., P.
Page 29 and 30: "SECONDLY. If a power of Will deter
Page 31 and 32: "MOTIVE is usually considered as a
Page 33 and 34: 62 it suits best to gratify the vil
Page 35 and 36: is especially evident when, as is v
Page 37 and 38: 70 by the flavor, may be considered
Page 39 and 40: to gratify, the subjective motive.
Page 41 and 42: of choice. The former being a quali
Page 43 and 44: In the preceding paragraphs I have
Page 45 and 46: Mr. Webster also gives as one defin
Page 47 and 48: 97 Will, Part I., Section II., p. 5
Page 49 and 50: 105 Will, Part I, Section IV., p. 1
Page 51 and 52: But is this all? Is a mere thought
Page 53 and 54: in preference to both the sense of
Page 55 and 56: contend for in the case of man is t
Page 57 and 58: happen otherwise. This is not the t
Page 59 and 60: 133 of such events he has and can h
Page 61 and 62: On page 9 of the Inquiry he says, "
Page 63 and 64: is indissoluble--that there cannot
Page 65 and 66: is evident from the fact that, the
Page 67 and 68: CHAPTER VII: OMNISCIENCE DOES NOT F
Page 69 and 70: It is easy to prove that whatever w
Page 71: its agent cannot refuse to act it.
Page 75 and 76: that they are certainly future, or
Page 77 and 78: destroys all the force of the exhor
Page 79 and 80: for the Master's use. And we admit,
Page 81 and 82: 190 Institutes, Part II., Chapter V
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Page 87 and 88: are sojourners of the Dispersion in
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Page 91 and 92: In the first place, this doctrine i
Page 93 and 94: either prove God's necessitation of
Page 95 and 96: the choice, every possible result o
Page 97 and 98: 218 Will, Part II., Section XI., p.
Page 99 and 100: To this we reply, 1. The destructio
Page 101 and 102: PREDICTIONS FOLLOWING THE FREE VOLI
Page 103 and 104: he caused, permitted, or predicted,
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Page 107 and 108: passions to bear fruit to David's p
Page 109 and 110: spoken of Judas. 1. Psalm 41:9. "Mi
Page 111 and 112: temporal, but as a spiritual power.
Page 113 and 114: nothing is said about any one's bei
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Page 117 and 118: Deut. 32:21, compared with Rom. 9:1
Page 119 and 120: 262 probability." In this sense of
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If depravity must be freely appropr
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probable facts of the future. The p
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his moral character changes, and as
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and denominator 41,410 figures. We
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Scriptures. but the signification o
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such as the Israelites committed be
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or foreknowing their free volitions
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Christ and his righteousness, and t
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(verse 34). The prophecy, then, was
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296 Epistle 2:18." He also says, "T
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when they are so manifestly spoken
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The Protestant world does not usual
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any free volition was made by him,
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it shall not prosper" verse 27. mi
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Isaiah 2;2-4. "And it shall come to
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Other evidence that he did not poss
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From the same notion of God's ignor
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