Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

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President Edwards seems to have no conception of any but unipotent causes. He does not see how a cause can have a possible effect, and yet the effect not necessarily result. It is true that in the realm of physical nature every possible effect necessarily becomes actual, but not so in the realm of mind. Within that realm there are events--viz., free volitions-- which are dependent on their cause, and yet are not necessarily connected therewith. Their existence is, "as it were, loose from its influence, and may attend it or may not, it being a mere contingence whether it follows or attends the influence of the cause or not;" and that is not the same thing as not to be dependent on it. When we say that one thing is dependent on another for its existence we simply mean that it cannot exist without the other, and surely there is no inconsistency in saying that a certain event cannot exist without a certain cause, and yet may or may not exist with it. Of course, if any events exist, they are necessarily connected with their cause; but the point is, they may not exist. Dr. Whedon says: 39 Will, Part II., Chapter II., pg. 97. 40 It is admitted that in the order of nature, so soon as a thing begins to exist, so far as it does exist, it necessarily exists, since it is impossible for the thing done to become not done. This necessity is consequent and subsequent in the order of nature to the existence. 3. It is granted that every volitional effect which comes into existence is "connected with its cause," is "dependent on its cause," derives its existence from its cause, and would not exist as it does without the cause. 4. But it is not admitted conversely, that the volitional cause depends on the effect, so but that it can exist in all its fullness and completeness, without producing that effect; or that it is necessitated to the effect. The proof is demanded that an agent cannot exist with full power to an act, without performing that act. The proof is demanded, but has never been furnished, that an agent may not be a sufficient or adequate cause without being a resultant cause. If it be said that a cause without an effect is no cause at all, it is again merely a verbal argument. We may define cause to be that in which power to [produce] the effect exists, and the argument is voided. We may affirm that a cause potential to an effect which it does not produce is still to be called thereto a cause. 39 President Edwards continues: 2. If there are some events which are not necessarily connected with their causes, then it will follow, that there are some things which come to pass without any cause, contrary to the supposition. For if there be any event which was not necessarily connected with the influence of the cause under such circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow the influence of the cause, or no; it might have followed, and it might not, when the cause was the same, its influence the same, and under the same circumstances. And if so, why did it follow rather than not follow? There is no cause or reason of this. Therefore here is something without any cause or reason why it is, viz., the following of the effect on the influence of the cause, with which it was not necessarily connected. If there be not a necessary connection of the effect on any thing antecedent, then we may suppose that sometimes the event will follow the cause, and sometimes not, when the cause is the same, and in every respect in the same state of circumstances. And what can be the cause and reason of this strange phenomenon, even this diversity, that in one instance, the effect should follow, in another, not? It is evident by the supposition, that this is wholly without any cause or ground. Here is something in the present manner of the existence of things, and state of the world that is absolutely without a cause; which is contrary to the supposition and contrary to what has been before demonstrated. 40 Will, Part II., Section VIII., pq. 46. 26
41 Will, Part II., Chapter II., P. 98 42 43 In reply to this, Dr. Whedon says: To the argument how can the diversity found in alternativity be accounted for we return a retort. How can we account for the uniformity found in unipotency? How can cause be necessitated to one effect? What forbids alternative effects, and limits and binds and imprisons cause down to one result? Here is a thing to be accounted for "in the present manner of the existence of things and the state of the world: which no man has ever yet accounted for; even this uniformity--this unipotency--by which every particular causality, physical and spiritual, finite and infinite, is fastened to one solely possible effect. 41 "Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all. But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal. For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit; to another faith by the same Spirit; to another the gifts of healing by the same Spirit; to another the working of miracles; to another prophecy; to another discerning of spirits; to another divers kinds of tongues; to another the interpretation on tongues: but all these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will." (I Cor. 12:4-11.) But what can be the cause of this strange phenomenon, even this diversity? Why does the Spirit divide to every man severally as he will? Will it be said that by different gifts he suits himself to different natures, that different endowments require diversities of operations? But God is the cause of these different endowments. What, then, can be "the cause and reason" of this strange phenomenon, even these different endowments? Evidently we can only answer by saying, Such is the will of the Spirit. The fact is, it is only in physical nature that such a diversity is a strange phenomenon. It is only among masses of inert matter that like causes always produce like effects. In the world of mind and in the exercise of free volitions diversity is normal, and uniformity the strange phenomenon. We naturally expect different men, though similarly endowed and similarly surrounded, to differ in choice. As Dr. Whedon well says, we can therefore account for the uniformity in physical nature, as well as the diversity in mental operations, only by saying, "Such is the nature of the case--there are two classes of causes: in one lies the power, I know not how, to terminate in one sole effect; in the other, I know not how, lies the power of terminating in either of several effects." 42 "To that grand inquiry, What determines the Will?" then, as presented by President Edwards, the answer is obvious. "By determining the Will," says he, "if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended, causing that the act of the Will or choice should be thus, and not otherwise; and the will is said to be determined, when, in consequence of some action or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon 43 a particular object." We take the meaning of the phrase as President Edwards intended to present it, and answer the question by saying, Nothing whatever. The will is not determined either by itself or any thing else. If the question were, What determines the free act of the will? or if it simply means, What causes that the free act of the will should be thus, and not otherwise? we should answer, The will itself. The will, by its very nature, and the will alone, puts forth its free act, and causes that act to be as it is, and not otherwise; but then this is not done in consequence of some previous action or influence. The question assumes that something causes the will to determine what particular act it shall put forth. The assumption is gratuitous. The determination is the putting forth of the free act, for there is no difference between putting forth an act and causing that act to be as it is, and not otherwise; and neither the will itself nor any thing else causes the will to put forth its free act. The will, in its proper conditions, is a complete cause, and "a complete cause" needs Will, Part II., Chapter II., p. 99. Will, Part I., Section II., p. 3. 27
Page 1 and 2: THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD 1 or, THE
Page 3 and 4: PREFACE I am not entirely pleased w
Page 5 and 6: Bayle, "is to cause it, if he can,
Page 7 and 8: imply no contradiction. Hence it is
Page 9 and 10: 3 Theodicy, p. 198. FAILURE OF DR.
Page 11 and 12: harmonies of sound. Moral agency, i
Page 13 and 14: constituted the reason why he, for
Page 15 and 16: heaven," as well as the angels; yet
Page 17 and 18: One point more from Dr. Bledsoe. He
Page 19 and 20: power not to perform. As a free act
Page 21 and 22: of the soul." But to return. A free
Page 23 and 24: 33 President Edwards. 34 35 consequ
Page 25: But experience may show a class of
Page 29 and 30: "SECONDLY. If a power of Will deter
Page 31 and 32: "MOTIVE is usually considered as a
Page 33 and 34: 62 it suits best to gratify the vil
Page 35 and 36: is especially evident when, as is v
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Page 39 and 40: to gratify, the subjective motive.
Page 41 and 42: of choice. The former being a quali
Page 43 and 44: In the preceding paragraphs I have
Page 45 and 46: Mr. Webster also gives as one defin
Page 47 and 48: 97 Will, Part I., Section II., p. 5
Page 49 and 50: 105 Will, Part I, Section IV., p. 1
Page 51 and 52: But is this all? Is a mere thought
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Page 57 and 58: happen otherwise. This is not the t
Page 59 and 60: 133 of such events he has and can h
Page 61 and 62: On page 9 of the Inquiry he says, "
Page 63 and 64: is indissoluble--that there cannot
Page 65 and 66: is evident from the fact that, the
Page 67 and 68: CHAPTER VII: OMNISCIENCE DOES NOT F
Page 69 and 70: It is easy to prove that whatever w
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destroys all the force of the exhor
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for the Master's use. And we admit,
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190 Institutes, Part II., Chapter V
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the Scripture says of God's immutab
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eginning of the condition of things
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are sojourners of the Dispersion in
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emotion, and constitute the princip
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In the first place, this doctrine i
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either prove God's necessitation of
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the choice, every possible result o
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218 Will, Part II., Section XI., p.
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To this we reply, 1. The destructio
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PREDICTIONS FOLLOWING THE FREE VOLI
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he caused, permitted, or predicted,
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clearly indorses the doctrine that
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passions to bear fruit to David's p
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spoken of Judas. 1. Psalm 41:9. "Mi
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temporal, but as a spiritual power.
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nothing is said about any one's bei
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determined before to be done." 252
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Deut. 32:21, compared with Rom. 9:1
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262 probability." In this sense of
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no matter how many times it has bee
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If depravity must be freely appropr
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probable facts of the future. The p
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his moral character changes, and as
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and denominator 41,410 figures. We
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Scriptures. but the signification o
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such as the Israelites committed be
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or foreknowing their free volitions
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Christ and his righteousness, and t
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(verse 34). The prophecy, then, was
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296 Epistle 2:18." He also says, "T
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when they are so manifestly spoken
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The Protestant world does not usual
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any free volition was made by him,
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it shall not prosper" verse 27. mi
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Isaiah 2;2-4. "And it shall come to
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Other evidence that he did not poss
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From the same notion of God's ignor
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Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

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