Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

in preference to both the sense of duty and the love of ease. Then the chosen passion is evidently more
deeply fixed in the soul; for the love of ease, being now refused, can no longer operate as an inducement
to change. It now requires another inducement; and if this is refused, still another. The passion may become
less and less susceptible of refusal. Of course a changeable character may be formed by frequently
accepting opportunities for reversal of choice, but as a kindred process is usually carried on along several
lines of conduct, the probability is great of a fixedness of character along some one of these lines.
Is not this the way in which habits are formed? Does not a habit consist in an emotion's becoming
more or less deeply in the soul by successive acts of choice? Perhaps not altogether. For an emotion or
passion, after having been gratified a sufficient number of times, seems to acquire power to produce action
without any further action of will, even in making subordinate volitions; that is, habit frequently makes action
involuntary. Thus, after a sufficient amount of practice on the piano, a lady's fingers go on in their work
without her special attention, being guided merely be the sound as it impresses itself on the organ of
hearing. It is well known, too, that a man sometimes acquires such a strong involuntary tendency to certain
kinds of physical or mental action that it requires a considerable effort of the will to resist it. Yet, if a choice
once made did not with some degree of fixedness go forward to the performance of several voluntary
actions, it seems hardly possible that a sufficient number of repetitions would be made to form a habit of this
kind. The repetitions by which a lady's fingers acquire the power to do their work involuntarily are the result
of one continued predominant purpose.
We can now understand how moral inability arises. Recurring to the illustrations of moral inability
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given by President Edwards, the woman is unable to prostitute herself to her slave, because, in fixing her
principles of honor and chastity, she has already refused every emotion which could operate as a motive
to a change of character. The child, in choosing great love and duty to his parents, has chosen them in
preference to every emotion which could induce to the opposite course. A man may be so accustomed to
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do evil as to be unable to do good, because all the motives which could induce to a change have been
exhausted; being already refused, they can no longer operate as inducements.
But does not this view, it may be asked, contradict the testimony of consciousness? However
habituated we may be to wrong-doing, do we not know that we have the power to do right? Says Bishop
Marvin, "I have been asked if it is possible for a man to will to inflict wanton cruelty upon his child. It is a very
rare thing, to be sure, that the force of the will is carried to such an unbridled extent...And yet, monstrous
and unaccountable cases do occur sometimes, proving the latent power of will in an appalling manner. And
does not every man feel that he has such power? He knows that he will not exert it, but does he not also
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know that he could?" To this I reply, He does not know that he can. He does not feel that he has such
power under the present conditions and circumstances. He only knows that he could do os if he would, that
is, if he chose to do so; but at the same time he knows that his choice to refrain from such an action has
already been made, and is not subject to change without a motive. Indeed, the form of Bishop Marvin's last
question indicates that he knows that he cannot. The past form of the verb is never used to denote present
time except in wishes or when there is a condition or supposition, and then it expresses the non-existence
both of the thing wished or supposed and of that which would come to pass under the supposition. Thus the
sentence, "If I had a pen, I would write," means that I have no pen, and therefore will not write. "Would that
I had wings like a dove; then would I fly away and be at rest" implies that I do not have wings like a dove,
and therefore will not fly away and be at rest. So "he knows that he could if he would" implies a knowledge
that he will not, and therefore cannot. But it may be said that the condition, "if he would," was not used by
Bishop Marvin. True; but the past form, could, referring to present time, cannot be properly used except in
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See p. 68.
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See Jeremiah 13:23.
Work of Christ, p. 32.
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