Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

imply no contradiction. Hence it is beyond the reach of almighty power itself to break up and
confound the immutable foundations of reason and truth. God possesses no such miserable power,
no such horribly distorted attribute, no such inconceivably monstrous imperfection and deformity of
nature, as would enable him to embody absurdities and contradictions in actual existence. It is one
of the chief excellencies and glories of the divine nature, that its infinite power works within a sphere
of light and love, without the least tendency to break over the sacred bounds of eternal truth, into
the outer darkness of chaotic night!
This conducts us to our second position; namely, that if God should cause a virtue to exist
in the breast of a moral agent, he would work a contradiction. In other words, the production of virtue
by any extraneous agency is one of those impossible conceits, those inherent absurdities, which
lie quite beyond the sphere of light in which the divine omnipotence moves, and has no existence
except in the outer darkness of a lawless imagination, or in the dim regions of error, in which the
true nature of moral goodness has never been seen. It is absurd, we say, to suppose that moral
agents can be governed and controlled in any other way than by moral means. All physical power
is here out of the question. By physical power, in connection with wisdom and goodness, a moral
agent may be created, and endowed with the noblest attributes. by physical power, a moral agent
may be caused to glow with a feeling of love, and armed with an uncommon energy of will; but such
effects, though produced by the power of God, are not the virtue of the moral agent in whom they
are produced. This consists, not in the possession of moral powers, but in the proper and obedient
exercise of those powers. If infinite wisdom, and goodness, and power, should muster all the means
and appliances in the universe, and cause them to bear with united energy on a single mind, the
effect produced, however grand and beautiful, would not be virtue of the agent in whom it is
produced. Nothing can be his virtue which is produced by an extraneous agency. This is a dictate
of the universal reason and consciousness of mankind. It needs no metaphysical refinement for its
support, and no scholastic jargon for its illustration. On this broad principle, then, which is so clearly
deduced, not from the confined darkness of the schools, but the open light of nature, we intend to
take our stand in opposition to the embattled ranks of atheism.
The argument of the atheist assumes, as we have seen, that a Being of infinite power could
easily prevent sin, and cause holiness to exist. It assumes that it is possible, that it implies no
contradiction, to create an intelligent moral agent, and place it beyond all liability to sin. But this is
a mistake. Almighty power itself, we may say with the most profound reverence, cannot create such
a being, and place it beyond the possibility of sinning. If it could not sin, there would be no merit, no
virtue in its obedience. That is to say, it would not be a moral agent at all, but a machine merely.
The power to do wrong, as well as to do right, is included in the very idea of a moral and
accountable agent, and no such agent can possibly exist without being invested with such a power.
To suppose such an agent to be created, and placed beyond all ability to sin, is to suppose it to be
what it is, and not what it is, at one and the same time; it is to suppose a creature to be endowed
with a power to do wrong, and yet destitute of such a power, which is a plain contradiction. Hence
Omnipotence cannot create such a being, and deny to it a power to do evil, or secure it against the
possibility of sinning.
Hence the error of the atheist is obvious. He does not consider that the only way to place
all creatures beyond a liability to sin, is to place them below the rank of intelligent and accountable
beings. He does not consider that the only way to prevent "sin from raising its head" is to prevent
holiness from the possibility of appearing in the universe. He does not consider that among all the
ideal worlds present to the Divine Mind, there was not one which, if called into existence, would
have been capable of serving and glorifying its Maker and yet incapable of throwing off his authority.
Hence, he really finds fault with the work of the Almighty, because he has not framed the world
according to a model which is involved in the most irreconcilable contradictions. In other words, he
fancies that God is not perfect, because he has not embodied an absurdity in the creature. If God,
he asks, is perfect, why did he not render virtue possible, and vice impossible? Why did he not
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