Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

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it suits best to gratify the vilest appetites." There is no doubt that, in a common, loose way of speaking,
men's acting voluntarily, their doing what they please, their doing what suits them best, and their dong what
is most agreeable to them, are used synonymously. The question is, Does such a common way of speaking
properly serve as a basis for "a careful and strict inquiry" into "the freedom of the will?" President Edwards
regards it as evidence that it is a universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind that volitions are
always as the greatest apparent good. The synonymous use of such expressions, he thinks, is based on
men's intuitions, and constitutes evidence that in some sense of the terms men's voluntary actions are
determined by their pleasantness or agreeableness. He does not contend that men always do what is most
agreeable to them in a selfish sense, for in that sense it is never true that "it is more agreeable to deny a
vicious inclination that to gratify it;" but in a sense which includes regard for the welfare of others. We do not
wish to understand the terms used by President Edwards in a different sense from that intended. We only
wish to understand exactly what he means; and we readily admit that, if men always do what is most
agreeable to them in any sense, and if at the same time that agreeableness precedes the act of choice, a
point has been made in favor of necessity. A more perfect understanding of the exact meaning of these
expressions as ordinarily used, and of their bearing upon the subject in hand, will perhaps be gained when
we come to consider the true nature of free volitions.
President Edwards presents the following argument in favor of the proposition that volition is always
determined by the strongest motive:
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Will, Part I., Section II., p. 7.
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An act of choice or preference is a comparative act, wherein the mind acts with reference to two or
more things that are compared, and stand in competition in the mind's view. If the mind in this
comparative act, prefers that which appears inferior in the comparison, then the mind herein acts
absolutely without Motive, or inducement, or any temptation whatsoever. Then, if a hungry man has
the offer of two sorts of food both which he finds an appetite to, but has a stronger appetite to one
than the other; and there be no circumstances or excitements whatsoever in the case to induce him
to take either the one or the other, but merely his appetite: if in the choice he makes between them,
he chooses that, which he has the least appetite to, and refuses that, to which he has the strongest
appetite, this is a choice made absolutely without previous Motive, excitement, reason or temptation,
as much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to either: because his volition in this case is a
comparative act, attending and following a comparative view of the food, which he chooses, viewing
it as related to, and compared with the other sort of food, in which view his preference has
absolutely no previous ground, yea, is against all previous ground and Motive. And if there be any
principle in man, from whence an act of choice may arise after this manner, from the same principle,
volition may arise wholly without Motive on either side. If the mind in volition can go beyond Motive
then it can go without Motive: for when it is beyond the Motive, it is out of the reach of the Motive,
out of the limits of its influence, and so without Motive. If volition goes beyond the strength and
tendency of Motive, and especially if it goes against its tendency, this demonstrates the
independence of volition on Motive. And if so, no reason can be given for what Mr. Chubb so often
asserts, even that in the nature of things volition cannot take place without a Motive to induce it.
If the Most High should endow a balance with agency or activity of nature, in such a manner,
that when equal weights are put into the scales, its agency could enable it to cause that scale to
descend, which has the least weight [Query: which is the least of two equal weights?], and so to
raise the greater weight; this would clearly demonstrate, that the motion of the balance does not
depend on weights in the scales, at least as much as if the balance should move itself, when there
is no weight in either scale. An the activity of the balance which is sufficient to move itself against
the greater weight, must certainly be more than sufficient to move it when there is no weight at all. 63
Will, Part II., Section X., p. 57.
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