Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

action, it is not necessary that he should interfere with the man's free agency; he has only, in the course of
his providence, to awaken some already chosen emotion, and so to influence the judgment as that the man
shall believe that that action will gratify it, and the thing is done. Now, let it be remembered that a vast
majority of voluntary actions are the result of principles fixed and established in the soul by previous choice.
Very few, comparatively, require any new ultimate choice. It is easy to see, therefore, that most of the
actions of moral agents can come directly and practically under God's control, and that, too, without any
interference with man's free agency, or any sudden and extraordinary change in the judgment.
But it may be said that, according to this view, God does not control all the voluntary actions of men;
that those must be excepted which are the first results of free volitions. Well, perhaps he does not. Perhaps
it is not necessary to the exercise of his all-pervading providence, that he should control all voluntary actions.
Yet we can easily see that he can control even the first results of free volitions. 1. He can in all such cases,
when the resultant action would not naturally carry out his wishes, cause some restraint to be thrown around
the agent by which he cannot carry out his intentions. 2. He can, as has been seen, step in between the
volition and the action, and either change the judgment or cause the emotion to cease.
Let us consider the first case, and see whether it is probable, in the light of experience and
observation, that God does to any great extent thus restrain men's actions. Be it remembered that a new
free volition is not made every day; not, at least, by an adult man. By the time he arrives at mature age his
principles of conduct have already to a great extent been established, a large number of his free volitions
having been made during the period of childhood and youth. The period of childhood and youth, then, is the
period in which perhaps a majority of a man's free volitions are made. It is then that the character is in the
most rapid process of formation. As the child grows into youth, and the youth into manhood, opportunities
for new free volitions become less and less frequent; for the greater the number of emotions already chosen,
of course the smaller the number to be chosen. All the world is new to a child, and all his volitions are newly
formed. But the man has already made his choice along many lines, and most of his plans and operations
are merely the means which he judges to be best for carrying his choice into effect. But the child is largely
under restraint. His parents do not allow him to exercise his judgment and carry out all his intentions. God,
therefore, can and most probably does control a child's actions through the medium of his parents. A very
large number of the first results of free volitions thus come directly and practically under God's control.
Let us now consider the case of an adult. Suppose that the Lord cannot, without departing from what
we know to be his usual plans, control the first results of an adult's free volitions. The special opportunities
for their exercise are nevertheless evidently in his hand; that is, it is in his power to select the time at which
each new free volition may be made. He can, therefore, so select the time and the circumstances that,
whatever choice may be made, the resulting action will not interfere with his plans. But it is not necessary
to suppose this. The adult is somewhat under restraint, as well as the child; not so much, it is true, but he
has also not so many free volitions to make. Moreover, although it is not the most usual thing for a man to
change his notion after having decided on a certain course of action, yet we know that this is sometimes
done. Then, as the first results of free volitions are few in number compared with the other voluntary actions
of an adult, it is not unreasonable to suppose that a change of judgment occurs in every case of a new free
volition when the resulting action would not carry out God's designs. We see, then, how God can control all
the voluntary actions of men without destroying their free agency and without departing from what we know
in the light of experience and observation to be his usual plans of government. It remains to be seen whether
he does do so or not.
President Edwards says, "In efficacious grace, God does all, and we do all. God produces all, and
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we act all. For that is what he produces; namely, our own acts." This is not true in the sense in which it
is understood by President Edwards. God does not produce our free volitions. But we cannot deny that it
is in the main true of our voluntary actions, the results of our volitions.
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As quoted by Dr. Bledsoe, Theodicy, p. 179.
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