Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

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understanding affirms that the action contemplated will best gratify the chosen emotion. "I choose," says Dr. Whedon, "that is, appropriate to myself, one of a lot of apples, because I see it comparatively most eligible or preferable. I choose one of two roads at a fork because I see it comparably the preferable. I choose from 101 among professions that which seems comparatively most eligible." But it must be remembered that this eligibility or preferableness is merely the capacity to carry into effect some previous free choice. In any other sense I do not always choose that which is most eligible; that is, I do not always choose that which I know ought to be chosen. The real act of choice does not follow any last dictate of the understanding; it is not subject to any decision of the intellect. When I choose any particular thing it is not the act of choice, but merely the goal or state of the choice, that is dependent on my seeing that it is most eligible. The real object of choice in every case is some emotion, and a choice of this is dependent on no previous action of the intellect; but of course this choice cannot reach its goal, that is, it cannot become a choice of that particular thing, until the judgment affirms that that thing will gratify the emotion. We conclude, then, that there are such things as free volitions; that they are not dependent on any state of the intellect nor on any motive except the things to choose. Their only cause is the mind which produces them, and it produces them with full power for contrary action. But all volitions are not free in the sense in which free volitions have been herein defined. The majority, indeed, are subordinate. Yet these subordinate volitions are free in one sense; they are not necessitated by causes over which the mind has not and never had any control. 101 Will, p. 18. 102 103 104 Theodicy, p. 131. Will, Part III., Section I., p. 83. Ibid., Part III, Section II., p. 86. CHAPTER V: NECESSARY HOLINESS OR SIN 102 "No necessitated act of the mind," says Dr. Bledsoe, "can be its virtue or its vice." To this proposition President Edwards objects. He says that there can be and are necessary actions which are admitted on all hands to be virtuous or sinful. In the first place, he says that there is such a thing as a moral inability in certain cases to do right or wrong; yet that this moral inability does not render the action less worthy of praise or blame. In the second place, he says that "God's moral excellency is necessary, yet 103 virtuous and praiseworthy." And in the third place, he says that "the acts of the will of the human soul of Jesus Christ were necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable," etc. 104 He gives the following instances of moral inability: A woman of great honor and chastity may have a moral Inability to prostitute herself to her slave. A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be unable to be willing to kill his father. A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust. A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking strong drink. A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under the 48
105 Will, Part I, Section IV., p. 16. 106 Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil." (Jer. 13:23.) 107 108 109 power of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their esteem and affection. A strong habit of virtue, and a great degree of holiness may cause a moral Inability to love wickedness in general, may render a man unable to take complacence in wicked persons or things; or to choose a wicked life, and prefer it to a virtuous life. And on the other hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love and choose holiness; and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy being, or to choose and cleave to him as his chief good. 105 106 It is admitted that there is such a thing as a moral inability to do right or wrong, and that this moral inability does not always make an action less worthy of praise or blame. It is admitted that God's actions are in a certain sense necessary, yet virtuous. It is admitted also that the actions of Jesus Christ were in one sense necessarily holy. Yet, notwithstanding all this, we must maintain with Dr. Bledsoe that no necessitated act of the mind can be its virtue or its vice. If to any mind there appears any difficulty in seeing how these things can hang together, a consideration of the permanence of free volitions, from which arises a certain degree of uniformity in voluntary actions, may help to remove it. That there is some uniformity in voluntary actions is a matter of general observation. Bishop Marvin says, "A certain degree of uniformity is usual in individual action and character. If it were not so, no government would be possible. There is some uniformity of results, both from 107 right and wrong influences." But why does this uniformity exist? If every individual action is free, or is the result of its own separate free volition, it certainly must be entirely independent of every other action; then why should we expect a man's actions under the same circumstances to be alike? We might, indeed, say with Dr. Whedon that "the very definition of a free Will is in proof that uniformity may be its course as truly 108 as variety or irregularity. If the Will can choose either way, it can choose in a uniform way." But this does not answer the question; for we not only know that uniformity may be its course, but we expect uniformity. We do not look for great irregularity in men's actions and character; yet is not the very definition of free will in proof that variety or irregularity may be its course as truly as uniformity? Why, then, do we expect uniformity? The question is not, Why may men's actions or character be uniform? What is the cause, not of possible, but of actual, uniformity? If, in one hundred throws of a certain die, a six should turn up every time, and the question should be asked, What is the reason for such a uniformity of results? it would not be considered a sufficient answer to say that by the very nature of unloaded dice a six is as apt to show each time as any thing else. Uniformity is due to the influence of motives, says Dr. Whedon. So also says Bishop Marvin. "It [the will] acts in view of motives, and while motives are not of the nature of mechanical forces, yet the reason, judging of the value of the different motives, makes intelligent choice possible. Hence a certain degree of 109 uniformity is usual in individual action and character." If properly understood, there is no doubt that this reason is the true one. Uniformity is due to the sameness of motive. If a certain motive is known to influence a man's actions once, we naturally expect it to influence them again. Indeed, uniformity consists in this very thing of acting continuously under the influence of the same motive. A man is not expected continuously to perform the same physical actions in all their details; he is only expected to act on the same principles, or Work of Christ, p. 35. Will, p. 164. Work of Christ, p. 35. 49
Page 1 and 2: THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD 1 or, THE
Page 3 and 4: PREFACE I am not entirely pleased w
Page 5 and 6: Bayle, "is to cause it, if he can,
Page 7 and 8: imply no contradiction. Hence it is
Page 9 and 10: 3 Theodicy, p. 198. FAILURE OF DR.
Page 11 and 12: harmonies of sound. Moral agency, i
Page 13 and 14: constituted the reason why he, for
Page 15 and 16: heaven," as well as the angels; yet
Page 17 and 18: One point more from Dr. Bledsoe. He
Page 19 and 20: power not to perform. As a free act
Page 21 and 22: of the soul." But to return. A free
Page 23 and 24: 33 President Edwards. 34 35 consequ
Page 25 and 26: But experience may show a class of
Page 27 and 28: 41 Will, Part II., Chapter II., P.
Page 29 and 30: "SECONDLY. If a power of Will deter
Page 31 and 32: "MOTIVE is usually considered as a
Page 33 and 34: 62 it suits best to gratify the vil
Page 35 and 36: is especially evident when, as is v
Page 37 and 38: 70 by the flavor, may be considered
Page 39 and 40: to gratify, the subjective motive.
Page 41 and 42: of choice. The former being a quali
Page 43 and 44: In the preceding paragraphs I have
Page 45 and 46: Mr. Webster also gives as one defin
Page 47: 97 Will, Part I., Section II., p. 5
Page 51 and 52: But is this all? Is a mere thought
Page 53 and 54: in preference to both the sense of
Page 55 and 56: contend for in the case of man is t
Page 57 and 58: happen otherwise. This is not the t
Page 59 and 60: 133 of such events he has and can h
Page 61 and 62: On page 9 of the Inquiry he says, "
Page 63 and 64: is indissoluble--that there cannot
Page 65 and 66: is evident from the fact that, the
Page 67 and 68: CHAPTER VII: OMNISCIENCE DOES NOT F
Page 69 and 70: It is easy to prove that whatever w
Page 71 and 72: its agent cannot refuse to act it.
Page 73 and 74: It would not conflict with any noti
Page 75 and 76: that they are certainly future, or
Page 77 and 78: destroys all the force of the exhor
Page 79 and 80: for the Master's use. And we admit,
Page 81 and 82: 190 Institutes, Part II., Chapter V
Page 83 and 84: the Scripture says of God's immutab
Page 85 and 86: eginning of the condition of things
Page 87 and 88: are sojourners of the Dispersion in
Page 89 and 90: emotion, and constitute the princip
Page 91 and 92: In the first place, this doctrine i
Page 93 and 94: either prove God's necessitation of
Page 95 and 96: the choice, every possible result o
Page 97 and 98: 218 Will, Part II., Section XI., p.
Page 99 and 100:
To this we reply, 1. The destructio
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PREDICTIONS FOLLOWING THE FREE VOLI
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he caused, permitted, or predicted,
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clearly indorses the doctrine that
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passions to bear fruit to David's p
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spoken of Judas. 1. Psalm 41:9. "Mi
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temporal, but as a spiritual power.
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nothing is said about any one's bei
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determined before to be done." 252
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Deut. 32:21, compared with Rom. 9:1
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262 probability." In this sense of
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no matter how many times it has bee
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If depravity must be freely appropr
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probable facts of the future. The p
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his moral character changes, and as
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and denominator 41,410 figures. We
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Scriptures. but the signification o
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such as the Israelites committed be
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or foreknowing their free volitions
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Christ and his righteousness, and t
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(verse 34). The prophecy, then, was
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296 Epistle 2:18." He also says, "T
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when they are so manifestly spoken
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The Protestant world does not usual
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any free volition was made by him,
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it shall not prosper" verse 27. mi
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Isaiah 2;2-4. "And it shall come to
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Other evidence that he did not poss
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From the same notion of God's ignor
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