Foreknowledge by Joel Hayes - Library of Theology

Mr. Webster also gives as one definition of the word choice, "The voluntary act of selecting or
separating from two or more things that which is preferred." I have not been regarding this as a meaning of
the word. It seems to me that the choice, is any ordinary acceptation, precedes this. But the name amounts
to nothing. Let this effort of the mind be called a choice, if any one thinks that the usage of the best writers
and speakers justifies it. It is conceded to be a volition, or act of the will; and it is evidently a very distinct
thing from the act of ultimate choice. Let this effort of the mind and the free act of choice, then, be classed
together under the general name of "choice," if it is thought most suitable, just as they are classed under the
general name of "volition," but let them be regarded as distinct things, and not melted together into a mass
of confusion in talking about them.
There seem, then, to be two kinds of acts of the will: 1. A choice, or purpose, to gratify some
emotion. 2. An effort of mind of which some physical or mental action is the immediate result. But may there
not be a third kind? I determine, for instance, at some future time to pursue a certain line of conduct or to
perform some physical act. What is this determination? It is evidently a fixedness of mind, a purpose, and
certainly belongs to the domain of the will. Yet it seems to be a different thing from the effort of mind just
spoken of, for that effort, when made, is immediately followed by the physical act. Moreover, it is a different
thing from a real act of choice--a choice to gratify some emotion. Two views may be taken here. It may be
regarded as a complex faculty of the soul, consisting of a choice to gratify some emotion, and a judgment
or decision that that line of conduct or that physical act will accomplish that purpose; or it may be thought
to be a pure act of the will, and merely a result of the aforementioned real choice and judgment. The latter
seems, in the light of consciousness, to be the true view; for a purpose of this kind frequently remains as
a permanent basis of action after the decision, the act of judgment, on which it is based, has passed out of
the sphere of consciousness.
Let us, then, regard acts of the will, or volitions, as being of three kinds: 1. An act of choice, or primal
purpose. 2. A determination based on this act of choice. 3. An effort of mind of which some physical or
mental action is the immediate result. Mr. Webster calls the second class (or perhaps the first and second)
immanent volitions; the third, emanant, executive, or imperative volitions. Thus he says, "When we have
`made up our minds' (as we say) to a thing, i. e., have a settled state of choice respecting it, that state is
called an immanent volition; when we put forth any particular act of choice, that act is called an emanent,
or executive, or imperative, volition." He also distinguishes between predominant and subordinate volitions.
"When an immanent, or settled state of choice," says he, "is one which controls or governs a series of
actions, we call that state a predominant volition; while we give the name of subordinate volitions to those
particular acts of choice which carry into effect the object sought for by the governing or `predominant
volition.'" The first class are evidently the real predominant volitions, while the second and third class are
subordinate. Some of the second class, however, may be relatively predominant; indeed, there may be a
series of volitions, as illustrated on page 51, each of which, except the first and last, is both predominant and
subordinate, each being predominant to the one succeeding and subordinate to the one preceding.
Now, the third class of volitions are evidently the results of the second, and the second are the
results of the first and some act of judgment. For it is evident that, if a choice or purpose to gratify some
emotion is fixed in the soul, and a judgment exists that a certain line of conduct will best accomplish that
purpose without conflicting with any other set purpose, the determination to pursue that line of conduct must
be put forth. The first is the predominant, or ruling volition; the second is subordinate to it, or its necessary
result. The first class of volitions, then, are the only kind that are truly free, the others being bound to them
by the tie of necessity.
This last proposition Dr. Whedon seems to deny. He says, "STANDARD PURPOSES are volitions
adopting an extended course of volitional actions, and to which, in consequence, an extended number of
volitions subordinate themselves. They are plans, enterprises, resolutions, determinations, which
contemplate and include a due number of volitions in obedience to themselves. Yet it is important to note
that these standard volitions do not of themselves directly and of their own power necessitate the
subordinate volitions. A man is free in carrying out his plans and resolutions. The existence of the plan as
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