ajAti vAda

premises of any question or definition that presupposes duality. As an aside, these
authors are quite aware that their method is very close to the madhyamaka approach, but
they categorically assert brahman as the only absolute, and still find fault with
nAgArjuna for not asserting the existence of one absolute.
dRshTi-sRshTi vAda :-
This brings me to the third view, namely dRshTi-sRshTi vAda - the view that cognition
and creation are simultaneous. It is generally assumed that this view was first
propounded by prakASAnanda sarasvatI (ca. 16th century CE) - in his vedAntasiddhAnta-muktAvalI.
This author also wrote texts on SrIvidyA, such as tArAbhaktitarangiNI.
It is generally assumed that this view is an entirely new position, unknown to
earlier authors in the advaita tradition. However, it should be pointed out that the
gauDapAdIya kArika also teaches a very similar view in its arguments leading up to
ajAti vAda. This view comes close to many schools of subjective idealism and to the
buddhist vijnAnavAda. It also seems to throw up the most interesting logical paradoxes
that are familiar to those interested in interpretations of quantum mechanics, e.g. the act
of observation itself causing a particular collapse of a wave function, thus creating its
outcome in some sense, and the absolute necessity of the observer in any description of
an event.
Within traditional vedAnta discourse, numerous objections can be raised against this
view. If ISvara exists in the vyAvahAric sense, then is he the creator of the universe or
not? If yes, dRshTi-sRshTi vAda is contradicted, for it holds that the jIva creates
simultaneously with cognition. This means there are multiple creators, in addition to
ISvara. If it is said that the jIva and ISvara are both brahman and the created entity is
also brahman (since everything is brahman), so that the creation by a jIva does not
contradict ISvara's creatorship, the objection to this would be that such a view ends up
partitioning brahman into several different real entities, but brahman cannot be so
divided. If ISvara is said not to be the creator, then this view contradicts Sruti. Besides,
what is the practical use, to the spiritual aspirant, of admitting such an ISvara?
In answer to all these objections, it should be emphasized that the dRshTi-sRshTi view is
also closely allied to what is known as the eka-jIva vAda, and cannot be viewed
independently of it. The eka-jIva vAda holds that, ultimately speaking, there is only one
jIva, which is identical with brahman. If this is understood, all the above objections
simply vanish. There is no question of multiple creators, as there is only the one jIva,
identical with brahman. The dRshTi-sRshTi vAdin also does not "really" partition
brahman into several different entities. On the contrary, it is the above mentioned
objector who actually assumes that brahman can be so partitioned. As for the practical
use to the spiritual aspirant, the dRshTi-sRshTi view is freely admitted to be useful only
for the advanced sAdhaka who does not cling to a view of multiple, real jIvas. Such an
aspirant also does not define his ISvara with respect to the creation, and is, in fact, better
suited to really understand what the Sruti means, when it says that brahman creates by
mere seeing (tad aikshata).