SITUATION ANALYSIS OF THE SMALL-SCALE GOLD ... - WWF
SITUATION ANALYSIS OF THE SMALL-SCALE GOLD ... - WWF
SITUATION ANALYSIS OF THE SMALL-SCALE GOLD ... - WWF
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Figure 6.3. Gold marketing chain<br />
Suriname gold<br />
miner/ service<br />
provider<br />
Gold miner/<br />
service provider<br />
working in<br />
Guyana or<br />
French Guiana<br />
LEGAL <strong>GOLD</strong> MARKETING<br />
Legal<br />
buyer<br />
Unlicensed<br />
dealer<br />
Jeweler<br />
Exporter<br />
ILLEGAL <strong>GOLD</strong> MARKETING<br />
CBvS<br />
International<br />
illegal trade<br />
circuit<br />
Jewelry<br />
International<br />
gold refining<br />
companies<br />
Gold can follow many routes to end up in the illegal circuit (Figure 6.1). The miner or<br />
service provider may decide to sell to a jeweler, usually of Chinese descent, or another<br />
unlicensed buyer. Jewelers may use a share of this gold to produce jewelry, but most of<br />
this gold ends up on the international illegal gold market. The exporter also may decide to<br />
bypass the Central Bank and royalty payments, to instead sell illegally to international<br />
buyers. This requires that the exporter or his or her connections smuggle the gold abroad.<br />
The arrest of smugglers at the international airport several times a year suggests that<br />
illegal gold marketing continues to be a lucrative business.<br />
An evaluation of changes in gold purchasing policy shows that the CBvS has been quite<br />
adaptive to customary practices in marketing. From being the sole purchaser, a position<br />
that was impossible to hold, it has now opened up the buying market. Today the Bank<br />
itself merely serves as a regulatory body and collector of royalties. This policy appears to<br />
work fairly well, though the control of buyers and exporters remains problematic. The<br />
Bank‟s involvement has shifted from strict control, with a presence in all legal buying<br />
centers, to a more removed position. The role of licensed private sector involvement<br />
should be extended to the interior, so that better control can be exercised at the source of<br />
production. Perhaps a more active involvement of the concession leasing enterprises or a<br />
miner‟s association could help government get a better grip on the gold trade in<br />
Suriname. The role of mine inspectors in the process of gold buying in the interior is also<br />
critical, once again indicating the importance of a government presence in the remote<br />
mining areas.<br />
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